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I. Introduction
You	 have	 come	 to	 the	 troubling	 realization	 that	 a	 friend	 of	 yours,	
whom	you	have	loved	with	affection	for	many	years,	isn’t	the	person	
he	seemed	to	be.1	You	hadn’t	taken	seriously	enough	the	gossip	about	
his	obnoxious	and	cruel	behavior.	You	never	doubted	his	values	when	
he	made	“colorful	remarks”.	And	in	the	last	few	years,	you’ve	been	so	
busy and	distracted	with	work	and	family that	you	haven’t	really	been	
paying	much	attention	to	him	at	all.	But	now	your	attention	is	focused,	
your	awareness	heightened,	and	your	eyes	clear.	You	see	now	that	he	
really	is	a	pig,	that	his	kindness	really	is	put	on,	and	that	his	charms	are	
merely	that		charms. He	is	not	refreshingly	flakey,	but	unreliable	and	
insincere.	Not	charismatic,	but	sloppy	and	arrogant.	What	you	once	
believed	to	be	his	good	qualities	you	now	see	as	veneer	over	a	mix	of	
vice	and	hollowness	underneath.	
Given	 this	 revelation,	 it	 would	 be	 reasonable	 to	 conclude	 that	
you’d	be	justified	in	cutting	your	friend	out	of	your	life.2	But	let’s	sup-
pose	that	even	if	you’d	be	justified	in	doing	so,	you	feel		maybe	be-
cause	you’ve	known	one	another	so	long	and	your	 lives	are	now	so	
interwoven,	or	maybe	because	he	is	so	isolated	and	disconnected	from	
his	other	friends	and	family,	or	maybe	because	you	simply	don’t	want 
to,	given	that	you	love	him		that	this	seems	too	simple	of	an	answer.	
Let’s	 suppose,	 too,	 that	 your	 friend	 isn’t	oblivious	or	 totally	beyond	
the	 pale.	He	 recognizes in	 himself	 the	flaws	 you	 see,	 and	 sees	 that	
1.	 For	clarity	and	consistency	with	an	example	I	will	discuss	in	more	detail	be-
low,	I	will	use	the	male	pronoun	for	the	beloved	and	the	female	pronoun	for	
the	lover.	
2.	 One	might	conclude	that	you	must, in	some	way,	stop	loving	your	friend	be-
cause	one	might	think	it	simply	impossible,	conceptually	or	psychologically,	
to	knowingly	love	the	vicious.	Alternatively,	one	might	think	that	there	is	a	
moral	obligation	or	duty	to	not	 love	the	vicious.	This	second	claim	is	often	
presented	as	an	intuition	about	what	morality	demands,	but	has	also	been	
defended	by,	 for	example,	Julia	Driver.	Driver,	“Love	and	Duty”,	Philosophic 
Exchange, 44:1	(2014).	Bernard	Williams	criticizes	a	similar	view	advanced	by	
David	A.	J.	Richards	in	Williams,	“Persons,	Character,	and	Morality”	in	Moral 
Luck	 (Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1981).	Richards’	view	is	pre-
sented	in	A Theory of Reasons for Action	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	1971).	
Also,	consider	Aristotle’s	view	of	friendship,	according	to	which	the	highest	
form	of	philia is	strictly	reserved	for	the	virtuous.
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in	light	of	the	ideal	of	attentive	love,	you	look	again at	your	friend to	
make	sure	your	judgment	isn’t	simply	mistaken.	Maybe	you’ve	been	
in	a	bad	and	unforgiving	mood	given	what’s	been	happening	at	work	
or	on	the	news.	Or	maybe,	following	Murdoch	here,	a	fundamentally	
egoistic	 concern	 of	 yours	 (perhaps,	 for	 example,	 you	 are	 really	 just	
worried	about	your	own	moral	reputation)	is	preventing	you	from	see-
ing	your	friend	as	the	decent	person	he	really	is.	As	Murdoch	reminds	
us,	 you	 need	 not	 only	 strive	 to	 see	 your	 friend	 accurately,	 but	 also,	
justly.	But	suppose	 that	your	new	view	of	him	is	not	best	explained	
by	moral-epistemological	imperfections	on	your	part.5	The	more	you	
observe	your	 friend	now	and	the	more	your	moral	consciousness	 is	
raised,	the	more	certain	you	are	that	you	were	badly	mistaken	before	
seeing	him	in	this	new	light.	And	again,	complicating	matters,	though	
you’ve	attended	to	your	friend	out of love	 for	him,	your	friend,	aware	
that	his	mask	has	slipped	and	your	perception	has	honed,	shrinks	from	
your	gaze,	exacerbating	the	estrangement	you	might	have	hoped	your	
love	could	overcome.	
At	this	point,	one	might	propose	a	way	of	loving	your	friend	that	is	
less	attentive.	As	philosophers	have	discussed,	there	are	other	forms	of	
love	that	do	not	place	so	much	importance	on	attending to	your	loved	
ones,	but	instead,	on	sharing	in	their	ends	or	being	committed	to	their	
wellbeing.6	Consider,	also,	that	many	good	friendships	are	constituted	
Philosophy, Film and Fiction,	 Susan	Wolf	 and	Christopher	Grau	 (eds.)	 (New	
York:	Oxford	University	Press,	2014).	
5.	 Thus,	the	case	I	am	interested	in	is	an	inverse	of	Murdoch’s	famous	case	of	M	
who	(arguably	because	of	her	snobbishness,	classism,	and	not-disinterested	
hopes	for	how	her	son’s	life	should	go)	cannot	initially	see	or	appreciate	her	
daughter-in-law,	D,	 for	who	she	really	 is.	Murdoch’s	meta-ethical	positions	
are	more	 complex	 than	 I	 can	 address	 here,	 but	 importantly,	my	 argument	
should	not	necessarily	be	understood	as	a	challenge	 to	Murdoch,	but	rather,	
as	a	development	of	the	conception	of	love	as	attention.	Thank	you	to	Bridget	
Clarke	for	pressing	me	on	this	point.
6.	 See	Kyla	Ebels-Duggan,	“Against	Beneficence:	A	Normative	Account	of	Love”,	
Ethics 119:1	 (2008).	There,	 she	 considers	Harry	Frankfurt’s	 view	as	paradig-
matically	representative	of	what	she	calls	 the	“benefactor	view”,	which	pro-
poses	that	love	is	essentially	about	desiring	the	beloved’s	wellbeing	for	his	
own	sake.
they	are	flaws.	But	though	this	gives	you	some	reason	to	resist	writing	
him	off	entirely,	it	also	complicates	your	continued	relationship.	You	
now	realize	that	his	self-awareness	is	accompanied	by	bouts	of	shame,	
which	in	turn	(you	now	realize)	explain	his	caginess,	artificiality,	and	
withdrawal	from	those	whom	he	suspects	have	seen	him	truly		 in-
cluding,	now,	yourself.3 
I	am	interested	in	cases	like	this,	where	one	loves	someone	of	vi-
cious	character	and	flawed	personality,	where	the	beloved	is	asham-
edly	aware	of	the	qualities	that	both	drive	others	away	and	drive	him	
away	from	others,	and	where	there	may	be	very	little	he	could	realisti-
cally	do	to	change the	qualities	that	may	both	challenge	one’s	love	of	
him	and	 spur	his	 feelings	of	 shame.	What	 is	 interesting	about	 such	
cases	is	that	though	they	seem	to	simply	yield	a	hostile	environment	
for	 human	 connection,	 love	 can	 still	make	 communion	 or	 intimacy	
between	 lovers	possible.	But	 it	 isn’t	obvious	how	 this	 is	 so,	given	a	
certain	understanding	of	interpersonal	love	and	given	a	certain	under-
standing	of	shame.	
Consider	two	assumptions	about	interpersonal	love	that	drive	the	
puzzle.	The	first	 is	 that,	 ideally,	 love	encourages	and	 fosters	 connec-
tion	 and	 communion	 rather	 than	 estrangement	 between	 its	 parties,	
and	second,	that	one	centrally	important	and	desirable	aspect	of	love,	
discussed	by	Iris	Murdoch,	is	that	it	is	attentive,	where	the	ambition	of	
this	directed	attention	is	to	see	the	beloved	as he truly is.4 So	imagine:	
3.	 As	Stanley	Cavell	writes,	
 
	 There	are	no	lengths	to	which	we	may	not	go	in	order	to	avoid	being	re-
vealed,	even	 to	 those	we	 love	and	are	 loved	by.	Or	 rather,	especially	 to	
those	we	love	and	are	loved	by:	to	other	people	it	is	easy	not	to	be	known.	
“The	Avoidance	of	Love”	in	Must We Mean What We Say?: A Book of Essays 
(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1969),	284.
4.	 Iris	Murdoch,	The Sovereignty of Good (New	York:	Routledge,	2001).	Murdoch’s	
ideal	has	been	discussed	by,	among	others,	Martha	Nussbaum,	David	Velle-
man,	and	Susan	Wolf.	Nussbaum,	 “‘This	 story	 isn’t	 true’:	Madness,	Reason,	
and	Recantation	in	the Phaedrus”	in	The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in 
Greek Tragedy and Philosophy (Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2001).	
Velleman,	“Love	as	a	moral	emotion”,	Ethics,	109:2	(1999).	Wolf,	“Loving	At-
tention:	Lessons	 in	Love	 from	The Philadelphia Story”	 in	Understanding Love: 
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an	affectionate	love	that	is	sensitive	and	responsive	to	qualities	of	the	
beloved,	where	the	qualities	it	responds	to	are	not	exhausted	by	good 
ones,	but	include	the	qualities of human nature.	
II. Shame, Vision, and Alienation
Let	me	begin	by	describing	the	problem	in	more	detail,	which	I	will	
refer	to	as	the problem of alienation.	Importantly,	this	problem	is	distinct	
from	another	that	has	drawn	most,	if	not	all,	contemporary	philosophi-
cal	discussions	of	love:	the	question	of	the	justifiability or	rationality of	
loving	another	human	being,	either	 in	 contrast	 to	others	 (imagined	
to	be	just	as	lovable)	or	given	the	impartial	demands	of	morality.	This	
narrowing	of	our	focus	has	been,	I	think,	a	profound	mistake.	My	dis-
cussion	will	be	 instead	on	the	ability	of	 interpersonal	 love	to	satisfy	
what	we	might	think	of	as	one	of	its	internal	ideals,	or	proper	ends:	to	
foster	connection,	communion,	or	intimacy	between	its	parties.11 
possible	for	this	concept	to	be	extricated	from	its	theological	background	and	
still	found	to	have	value	in	non-theological	ethics?	I	propose	that	we	try.	Con-
sider	a	methodological	observation	 in	Annette	Baier’s	pivotal	work	on	 the	
value	of	trust: 
	 Just	as	 the	only	 trust	Hobbist	man	shows	 is	 trust	 in	promises,	provided	
there	is	assurance	of	punishment	for	promise	breakers,	so	is	this	the	only	
sort	of	trust	nontheological	modern	moral	philosophers	have	given	much	
attention	at	all	to,	as	if	once	we	have	weaned	ourselves	from	the	degener-
ate	form	of	absolute	and	unreciprocated	trust	in	God,	all	our	capacity	for	
trust	is	to	be	channeled	into	the	equally	degenerate	form	of	formal	volun-
tary	and	reciprocated	trust	restricted	to	equals.	But	we	collectively	cannot	
bring	off	such	a	limitation	of	trust	to	minimal	and	secured	trust,	and	we	
can	deceive	ourselves	that	we	do	only	if	we	avert	our	philosophical	gaze	
from	the	ordinary	forms	of	trust	I	have	been	pointing	to.	“Trust	and	Anti-
Trust”,	Ethics	96:2	(1986),	252.	
	 In	 this	 spirit,	 I	offer	a	nontheological	 conception	of	grace	or	gracious	 love,	
the	 need	 for	which	 remains	 even	 if	God	 is	 dead.	Once	we	 have	 “weaned	
ourselves”	from	His	grace	(for	worse	or	for	better),	it	would	be	a	mistake	to	
avert	our	philosophical	gaze	from	our	need	for	it,	as	well	as	from	the	ordinary	
forms	of	grace	I	will	point	to	here,	that	sometimes		miraculously,	albeit	in	
a	non-supernatural	sense		human	beings	feel	and	express	toward	one	an-
other	in	thoroughly	human	circumstances.	
11.	 While	 “intimacy”	 is	 ambiguous,	 I	 shall	 focus	 on	 connection	 and	 communion, 
rather	 than	on	 fusion and	procreation;	 thus,	 there	 is	 a	 respect	 in	which	 the	
by	simply	passing	time	together	given	a	shared	hobby.7	And	if	you	are	
worried	that	given	your	discovery,	you	would	no	longer	have	a	reason 
to	love	your	friend,	other	views	of	love	could	either	dispel	your	wor-
ries	by	pointing	out	just	how	blind	love	can	be,8	or	justify	your	contin-
ued	love	in	some	other	way,	perhaps	by	making	reference	to	the	long	
history	you’ve	shared.9 
But	 I	 shall	argue	 that	attentive	 love,	 though	seeming	 to	give	 rise	
to	the	puzzle,	is	the	way	out	of	it	as	well.	Although	it	may	appear	as	
though	 less	 attentive	 forms	 could	 re-establish	 connection	 between	
lovers	 in	 such	 cases,	 I	will	 argue	 that	 they	 cannot	 precisely	because 
they	are	 insufficiently	attentive,	and	because	of	what	 it	 is	 like	 to	be	
ashamed	of	who	you	are.	Rather	than	give	up	on	the	ideal	of	attentive	
love	in	light	of	this	problem,	I	argue	instead	that	we	should	reconsider	
what it is	that	we	love	about the	people	we	attend	to	in	a	loving	way.	
We	should	not,	I	propose,	limit	what	we	see	and	love	in	others	to	ei-
ther	just	the	good qualities	of	their	characters	or	personalities,	or	to	
an	isolatable	or	abstract	value	that	they	possess	simply	in	virtue	of	be-
ing	fellow	human	beings	or	ends-in-themselves.	I	shall	articulate	and	
argue	for	a	secular,	or	 interpersonal,	conception	of	grace:	a	 love	that	
is	not	blind,	but	is	also,	as	Robert	Adams	has	put	it,	non-proportional	
to	the	excellence	of	its	objects.10	On	the	proposal	I	will	offer,	grace	is	
7.	 Aristotle’s	 taxonomy	of	 friendships	might	 allow	 for	 you	 to	 continue	 being	
friends	in	this	case,	as	long	as	it	was	not	a	“character”	friendship,	leaving	only	
the	 possibility	 of	 either	 a	 relatively	 shallow	 friendship	 of	 pleasure	 or	 rela-
tively	depressing	friendship	of	utility.	
8.	 The	Irrationalist	position	that	we	do	not	love	for	reasons	at	all	has	been	most	
recently	and	prominently	defended	by	Harry	Frankfurt	 in	Necessity, Volition, 
and Love	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1999)	and	The Reasons of 
Love (Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press,	2004).
9.	 Niko	Kolodny,	“Love	as	Valuing	a	Relationship”,	The Philosophical Review,	112:2	
(2003).
10.	 Robert	Merrihew	Adams,	Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics	(Ox-
ford:	Oxford	University	 Press,	 1999).	 There	 is	 nearly	 no	work	 on	 grace	 in	
contemporary	analytic	moral	philosophy,	with	Adams	and	Glen	Pettigrove	
as	 rare	exceptions.	Pettigrove,	Forgiveness and Love	 (Oxford:	Oxford	Univer-
sity	Press,	2012).	The	fact	that	I	propose	a	secular	or	interpersonal conception	
of	grace	gives	rise	to	an	important	worry.	One	ought	to	wonder:	is	it	really	
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shame.	For	example,	 it	explains	why	one	does	not	feel	shame	when	
viewed	negatively	by	others	whose	views	one	does	not	recognize	as	
authoritative	at	all,	as	well	as	why	one	can	be	ashamed	in	light	of	stan-
dards	that	one	does	not	fully	share,	for	example,	by	one’s	appearance	
or	bad	manners,	even	if	one	does	not	actually	endorse	the	standards	
of	 appearance	 or	manners	 at	 play.	 The	 real	 social	 expectations	 em-
bodied	by	the	other	who	sees	you	may	not	be	wholly	identical	to	your	
own,	but	you	must	identify	with	them	enough	to	not	be	fully	outside	
their	authority,	as	one	might	feel	when	a	tourist	in	foreign	lands. And	
because	shame	is	prompted	by	being	seen or	viewed by	this	other	(real	
or	 imagined), it	 gives	 rise	 to	 its	 characteristic	 feelings,	 expressions,	
and	behavior:	for	example,	of	not	being	able	to	look	others	in	the	eye,	
covering	one’s	face,	wanting	to	hide,	to	sink	through	the	floor,	or	as	
Bernard	Williams	puts	it,	to simply disappear.	In	a	wave	of	shame,	one’s	
whole	self	can	feel	diminished,	because	of	the	feeling	that	“the	other	
sees	all	of	me	and	all	through	me”.14	And	because	the	imagined	other	
can	be	fully	 internalized,	these	urges	to	hide	typically	fail	 to	resolve	
themselves,	since	one	will	be	trying	to	escape	from	one’s	own	gaze	 
hence	for	the	tendency	of	shame	to	lead	to	self-destructive	impulses.	I	
will	focus	here	primarily	on	the	significance	of	shame	in	interpersonal	
relationships	with	actual	others:	on	how	it	alienates	or	estranges	one	
from	those	whose	seemingly	diminishing,	penetrating,	and	authorita-
tive	gaze	one	strives	to	escape.
Guilt,	too,	can	lead	to	interpersonal	alienation	and	estrangement.15 
Through	one’s	action,	one	has	violated	the	terms	of	a	relationship	with	
14. Shame and Necessity (Berkeley	and	Los	Angeles:	University	of	California	Press,	
2008),	89.	
15.	 As	T.	M.	Scanlon	writes,	 “…	the	pain	of	guilt	 involves,	at	base,	a	 feeling	of	
estrangement,	of	having	violated	the	requirements	of	a	valuable	relation	with	
others”.	What We Owe To Each Other	 (Cambridge,	MA:	Harvard	 University	
Press,	2000),	162.	While	I	agree	with	Scanlon	about	the	feeling	of	estrange-
ment,	it’s	not	clear	that	I	must	believe	I’ve	damaged a	relationship	in	order	to	
feel	guilty.	I	can	feel	guilty	for	just	directly	wronging	you	(even	if	no	relation-
ship	is	in	place),	and	I	can	feel	guilty	even	if	I	don’t	suspect	I’ve	damaged	our	
existing	relationship.	Thank	you	to	Samuel	Reis-Dennis	for	discussion	of	this	
point.	
The	problem	of	alienation	is	best	 illustrated	by	a	familiar	kind	of	
situation	one	can	find	oneself	in	either	as	the	lover	or	the	beloved.	As	
described	above,	the	more	extreme	versions	are	situations	where	one	
loves	someone	of	vicious	character	and	flawed	personality,	where	the	
beloved	is	ashamedly	aware	of	these	qualities,	and	where	there	may	
be	very	little	he	could	realistically	do	to	change who	he	is.	Thus,	the	
beloved	is	alienated	from	others,	including	his	intimates,	not	just	be-
cause	he	lacks	the	qualities	that	may	make	loving	him	easy	and	clearly	
warranted,	but	because	of	the	characteristic	feelings	and	motivations	
that	come	with	the	experience	of	shame.	While	it	may	be	most	vivid	
and	philosophically	challenging	to	think	of	cases	where	the	beloved	is	
especially	or	seemingly	thoroughly	vicious	or	his	shame	especially	cut-
ting,	the	problem	can	arise	in	less	extreme	circumstances,	simply	be-
tween	any	two	lovers,	even	relatively	decent	ones	and	well-disposed	
ones	who	nonetheless	have	flaws	about	which	they	are	ashamed.12
Above,	I	noted	two	assumptions	about	interpersonal	love	that	mo-
tivate	 the	 problem:	 ideally,	 that	 it	 is	 both	 attentive	 and	 fosters	 con-
nection	or	communion.	But	the	logic	of	shame	shapes	and	drives	the	
problem	as	well.13	Roughly,	shame	is	the	painful	experience	of	being	
viewed	in	“the	wrong	way”	by	a	real	or	imagined	(internalized)	other,	
where	this	other	 is	(i)	a	person	whose	view	the	agent	recognizes	as	
partly	 authoritative,	 (ii)	 an	embodiment	of	 a	 real	 social	 expectation,	
and	(iii)	a	person	with	whom	the	ashamed	person	can	partly	identify.	
This	 complex	 structure	mirrors	 the	 complexity	 of	 the	 experience	 of	
ideal	I	am	discussing	is	of	philia and	not	eros.	I	will	not	primarily	use	examples	
of	erotic	lovers,	or	the	love	that	parents	have	for	their	children	to	illustrate	
my	arguments,	but	rather,	on	friends	and	siblings.	Of	course,	we	sometimes	
aspire	to	have	philia	with	our	erotic	lovers,	our	parents,	and	our	children,	so	
the	lines	cannot	be	drawn	sharply	here.	Thank	you	to	John	F.	Bowin	for	dis-
cussion	of	this	point.
12.	 Thank	you	to	Ryan	Preston-Roedder	for	this	observation.
13.	 This	rough	sketch	is	all	I	need	for	my	purposes	here;	I	am	relying	on	the	de-
tailed	work	of	Sartre,	Gabrielle	Taylor,	Bernard	Williams,	John	Deigh,	Herbert	
Morris,	Jeffrie	Murphy,	and	Sandra	Lee	Bartky,	especially	her	essay,	“Shame	
and	Gender”	in	Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenology of Op-
pression (New	York:	Routledge,	1990).
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or	look	away.	This	 is	why	when	one	is	ashamed,	one	might	not	feel	
punished, but	rather	exiled.	And	third,	the	aspect	of	shame	that	explains	
these	 two	 features	 is	 that	 shame	 is	 felt	 in	 regards	 to	who I am,	 and	
not	what I’ve done.	As	John	Deigh	writes,	“shame	is	felt	over	shortcom-
ings,	guilt	over	wrongdoings”.18	While	I	can	of	course	be	ashamed	be-
cause	of	an	action	I’ve	performed		given	that	 it	reveals	something	
shameful	about	me	or	because	it	is	part	of	a	larger	pattern	that	reveals	
something	 shameful	 about	me		 often	 there	 is	no	particular	wrong	
I	could	apologize	or	compensate	 for	 that	would	alleviate	my	shame,	
and	moreover,	often	what	I	am	ashamed	about	has	nothing	to	do	with	
what	I	owe	to	others.	Thus,	it	is	either	not	enough,	or	would	involve	a	
category	mistake,	for	me	to	apologize	or	compensate	others	in	order	
to	overcome	my	shame	and	re-establish	relations	with	them.	Rather,	I	
need	to change who I am.	As	Herbert	Morris	writes,	while	guilt	leads	to	
restoration,	shame	leads	to	creativity.19 
But	what	happens	in	the	non-ideal	case,	when	creativity	is	not	a	re-
alistic	option	for	the	ashamed	person?	Return	now	to	the	case	I	started	
with,	 in	which	 the	 beloved,	 though	 aware	 of	 his	 failings,	 cannot	 or	
will	not	change	in	the	relevant	way.	Perhaps	he	cannot	because	the	ap-
propriate	task	he	must	accomplish	here	is	the	difficult	one	of	substan-
tive moral improvement,	which	is	challenging	for	all	kinds	of	mundane	
reasons.	If	a	change	of	character	necessitates	something	like	habitua-
tion	and	reflection,	one	actually	needs	the	time,	energy,	and	resources	
to	do	both.	Bad	habits	are	difficult	to	quit,	we	are	too	susceptible	to	
mixed	motives	and	many	different	forms	of	akrasia, and	it	is	a	common	
phenomenon,	 as	Murdoch	warns,	 that	many	who	 actively	 strive	 to	
become	better	people	may	find	themselves	caught	in	a	self-absorbed	
spiral.20 
18.	 Deigh,	“Shame	and	Self-Esteem:	A	Critique”,	Ethics,	93:2	(1983),	225.
19.	 Morris,	62.
20.	“The	self	is	such	a	dazzling	object	that	if	one	looks	there one	may	see	noth-
ing	else”,	The Sovereignty of Good,	30.	For	discussion	of	this	observation,	see	
Samantha	Vice,	“The	Ethics	of	Self-Concern”	in	Iris Murdoch: A Reassessment, 
Anne	Rowe	(ed.)	(New	York:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	2007).
another;	 guilt	 is	 the	pained	 recognition	of	what	 one	has	 done,	 and	
perhaps	of	 the	damage	one	has	done	 to	one’s	 relationship	with	 the	
wronged	 person.	 But	 as	many	 have	 noted,	 guilt	 has	 its	 advantages	
when	it	comes	to	overcoming	this	estrangement.16	When	one	wrongs	
another	and	feels	guilt	in	response,	one	is	characteristically	motivated	
to	make	amends		when	I	feel	guilty	because	of	something	I’ve	done	
to	you,	I	want	to	look	you	in	the	eye,	apologize,	compensate,	and	re-
establish	relations	with	you.	I	hope	for	your	forgiveness,	and	if	I	am	
fortunate,	you	may	give	it	to	me.	I	may	want	to	kneel	before	you,	not	
hide from	you.	And	importantly,	your	resentment	or	indignation	in	re-
sponse	to	my	wrongdoing	may	motivate	you	to	come	to	me,	to	demand 
something	from	me	for	what	I	have	done,	thus	facilitating	reconcilia-
tion	in	a	way	that	simply	avoiding	me	or	feeling	contempt	or	pity	for	
me	would	not.17
Shame,	 however,	 is	 more	 complicated,	 and	 the	 route	 from	 the	
circumstances	 that	 prompt	 it	 to	 re-established	 relations	 with	 those	
it	estranges	one	from	is	less	clear	for	three	reasons.	First,	when	I	am	
ashamed,	the	people	whom	I	will	feel	estranged	from	will	not	be	lim-
ited	to	those	I	have	affected.	If	one	is	disposed	to	be	ashamed	of	one’s	
appearance,	any stranger’s	gaze	might	prompt	an	episode	of	 shame;	
if	one	is	disposed	to	be	ashamed	of	something	less	visible	than	one’s	
appearance	(one’s	social	class,	perhaps,	or	one’s	 lack	of	acumen,	 for	
example),	any	stranger’s	imagined discernment	of	this	fact could	do	so.	
Second,	while	guilt	is	productively	paired	with	the	resentment	or	in-
dignation	 of	 the	 people	my	wrongdoing	 estranges	me	 from,	 shame	
is	not	obviously	paired	in	this	way.	When	one	is	ashamed	in	front	of	
an	actual	other,	the	other	may	simply	feel	contempt,	pity,	or	vicarious	
embarrassment		emotions	that	do	not	characteristically	prompt	her	
to	 engage	with	 the	 person	who	 is	 ashamed,	 but	 rather,	 to	withdraw	
16.	 Herbert	Morris,	 “Shame	 and	Guilt”	 in	On Guilt and Innocence:	Essays in Le-
gal Philosophy and Moral Psychology	(Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press,	
1976).
17.	 For	discussion	of	this	point	about	angry	blame,	see	Samuel	Reis-Dennis,	“An-
ger:	Scary	Good”,	Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 97:3	(2019). 
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a	good	heart-to-heart.	Should	a	cool-headed	conversation	fail	to	move	
him,	 you	 could	 rely	on	blame’s	prolepsis,	 insisting, perhaps	even	an-
grily, that	he	get	himself	and	his	life	in	order.22	But	again,	suppose	the	
situation	is	not	amenable	to	your	hopes.	On	better	days,	your	friend	is	
convinced	he	should	reform	himself,	but	finds	that	though	he	tries,	he	
keeps	returning	to	his	usual	haunts;	on	worse	days,	he	becomes	embit-
tered	and	resentful	that	you	are	treating	him	in	this	way	because	he	is	
certain	he	either	can’t	or	won’t	change		your	sanctimonious	harping	
cannot	now	make	the	difference.	
So	you	might	consider	another	response:	compassion.	You	could	see	
him,	after	all,	as	having	gotten	to	where	he	is	because	of	events	from	
his	past	that	he	is	not	responsible	for.	You	could	see	him	now	presently	
subject	 to	 forces	and	motives	 that	make	him	a	victim	of	his	 circum-
stance,	brain	chemistry,	or	even	of	himself.	Seeing	a	person	in	these	
ways	can	often	mitigate	 the	 reactive	attitude	of	 resentment,	fill	one’s	
heart	with	pity	and	sorrow	instead,	and	move	one	to	sincerely	want	to	
simply	help	the	poor	thing.	But	notice	how	risky	an	attitude	like	com-
passion	is	in	this	kind	of	situation.	Even	sincere	pity	for	the	suffering	of	
a	well-disposed	person	can	threaten	his	dignity;	and	in	the	cases	I	have	
focused	on,	the	operations	of	shame	will	make	sense	of	why	the	less	
well-disposed	person,	 in	 an	 effort	 of	 self-protection,	might	 not	 take	
well	at	all	to	your	compassion		it	may	only	be	an	insult.23 
In	 contrast	 to	 tough	 love	 and	 compassion,	 the	 answer	 I	 shall	 ex-
plore	is	attentive love. According	to	Murdoch,	the	task	of	really	seeing 
22.	 Bernard	Williams,	“Internal	Reasons	and	the	Obscurity	of	Blame”	in	Making 
Sense of Humanity: And Other Philosophical Papers	 (Cambridge:	 Cambridge	
University	Press,	1995).
23.	 For	an	argument	that	well-intentioned	and	effective	beneficence	can	be	dis-
respectful	and	offensive,	with	a	focus	on	cases	of	the	disabled,	see	Adam	Cu-
reton,	“Offensive	Beneficence”,	Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 
2:1	 (2016).	Part	 of	 the	 explanation	 is	 that	 to	 view	a	person	 compassionately 
involves,	at	least	on	standard	conceptions,	seeing	him	as	a	patient	rather	than	
an	 agent.	 Unmoderated	 compassion	 is	 commonly	 mistaken	 for	 complete	
moral	vision,	even	(perhaps	especially)	for	the	most	well-intentioned.	For	a	
recent	film	that	succeeds	in	cultivating	a	sincere	form	of	compassion	at	a	se-
vere	cost	to	seeing	the	object	of	compassion	as	a	full	human	agent,	see	Roma.
But	 another	 difficulty	 is	 that	 the	 ashamed	 person	may	 be	 partly	
unwilling to	change	 in	 the	appropriate	way,	even	 though	he	can	see	
the	reasons	for	doing	so.	One	problem	with	emerging	from	a	shame-
ful	state	is	not	just	that	it	is	difficult	to	become	a	better	person	given	
the	assumption	that	one	is	wholeheartedly	invested	in	doing	so;	it	is	
also	that	in	many	cases,	because	one’s	character	and	outlook	is partly	
constituted	by	vices	(the	very	ones	one	may	be	ashamed	of),	one	may	
be	inclined	to	resist the	authority	of	the	moral	view	from	which	one	is	
being	seen.	Yes,	it	may	be	true	that	I	am	riddled	with	envy,	arrogance	
and	malice	—	but	given	that	 I	 just	am	 this	envious,	arrogant	and	ma-
licious	person,	 I	may	 feel	ashamed	while	also challenging	 the	moral	
gaze	which	issues	this	assessment,	and	which	I	am	ashamed	in	light	
of.21	 In	wanting	to	disappear	from	the	view	of	others,	 then,	 I	am	not	
simply	trying	to	avoid	the	pain	of	being	seen	by	them	—	I	may	also,	in	a	
last-ditch	effort	at	self-respect	and	defiance,	be	trying	to	protect myself.	
III. Love and Attentive Affection
Let	me	now	restate	the	puzzle	I	started	with,	incorporating	the	com-
plexities	of	shame.	How	are	we	to	respond	to	the	ashamed	beloved	 
not	just	so	that	he	has,	for	example,	his	wellbeing	attended	to,	or	his	
ends	respected	and	shared		but	so	that	he	feels	a	connection	or	com-
munion	with	those	whom	he	loves	and	who	love	him,	rather	than	the	
alienation	 and	 estrangement	 exacerbated	 by	 his	 shame?	What	 reac-
tions	are	available	to	those	who	see	him	as	he	is?	
One	answer	 is	 tough love.	That	 is,	you	could	rely	on	the	attitudes	
that	are	typically	paired	with	wrongdoing,	but	which	can	also	be	intel-
ligible	responses	to	someone	(usually	only	our	intimates)	in	an	effort	
to	get	him	to	become	a	better	person.	You	could	sit	him	down	and	have	
21.	 Consider	how	in	The Symposium, Alcibiades,	wracked	with	shame	and	desire,	
both	 loves	and	hates	Socrates	 for	 revealing	 to	him	the	possibility	of	virtue,	
and	for	reminding	him	that	he	cannot	achieve	it	without	becoming	someone	
else	entirely.	The	tension	arises	because	morality	and	virtue	civilize	and	con-
strain	our	baser	natures,	but	also	because	certain	moral	systems	can	threaten	
the	status	of	 things	 that	are	good	and	which	constitute	 the	good aspects	of	
who	we	are.	Susan	Wolf,	“Moral	Saints”,	Journal of Philosophy,	79:8	(1982).	
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cheer	up”.27	Stocker	characterizes	this	as	a	problem	of	the	“indirection”	
of	Smith’s	motives:	he	doesn’t	actually	care	about	you “directly”,	but	
rather,	cares	about	doing	his	duty	given	that	you	are a fellow x, or	the	
neediest	x around.28 
But	a	different	concern	arises	once	we	take	into	consideration	that	
there	are,	after	all,	duties	that	can	obligate	one	directly	to	a	particular	
person.	Consider	a	variation	of	Stocker’s	hospital	case.	An	old	friend	
of	yours,	Zahra,	is	not	visiting	you	because	you	are	a	fellow	whatever.	
She	is	visiting	you	because	it’s you, her	old	friend.	She	would	not,	out-
side	of	a	philanthropic	venture,	visit	some	other	x	in	the	hospital.	She	
is	here	 to	see	you	 in	particular. But	 importantly,	 imagine	 that	she	 is	
nonetheless	motivated	by	her	sense	of	duty.	
Consider	that	you	and	Zahra	were	once	thick	as	thieves,	but	she	
has	been	consistently	irritated	with	and	bored	by	you	for	months,	or	
even	years	now		not	because	of	any	particular	thing	you’ve	done,	but	
just	because	she	has	come	to	grow	tired	of	your	neurotic	fussiness	or	
alternatively,	your	filthy	sloppiness,	or	your	elaborate	love	of	bespoke	
cufflinks	or	nerdy	memorabilia,	or	your	endless	griping	about	“breed-
ers”.	 Importantly,	Zahra	doesn’t	hate	 you.	She	genuinely	wishes	you	
27.	 Stocker,	462,	my	emphasis.
28.	More	 recent	Kantian	 projects	 attempt	 to	 resist	 this	 objection;	 for	 example,	
Steven	Darwall’s	“second-person	standpoint”	is	an	attempt	to	conceptualize	
respect	as	essentially	directed	toward	and	responsive	to	an	individual,	partly	
in	response	to	Murdoch’s	complaint	that	this	is	what	Kant,	by	having	us	con-
cerned	with	the	moral	law	without,	cannot	capture.	However,	Darwall’s	con-
ception	of	Strawson’s	“participant	stance”	that	one	takes	on	when	engaging	
from	the	second-person	standpoint	wholly	moralized	is	most	fundamentally	
about	making	and	responding	to	certain	kinds	of	claims	on	one	another.	He	
only	briefly	mentions	the	role	of	love	in	engaging	with	an	individual	from	the	
participant	stance.	More	recently,	Melissa	Merritt	has	argued	that	Kant	takes	
our	obligations	to	be	grounded	in	and	directed	to	particular	individuals,	and	
not	simply	to	“the	human	being	as	such”.	Nonetheless,	I	will	argue	below	that	
even	if	Kantians	and	Kant	can	respond	to	Stocker’s	objection	as	he	originally	
presented	it,	my	variant	of	the	problem	of	alienation	still	has	teeth.	Darwall,	
The Second-Person Standpoint:	Morality, Respect, and Accountability	(Cambridge,	
MA:	Harvard	University	Press,	2006).	Merritt,	“Love,	Respect,	and	Individu-
als:	Murdoch	as	a	Guide	to	Kantian	Ethics”,	European Journal of Philosophy,	25:4	
(2017).
another	person	accurately	and	justly	is	a	moral	achievement	as	it	takes	
seeing	past	our	“fat,	relentless”	egos	in	order	to	recognize another	per-
son	as	part	of	a	reality	that	exists	beyond	ourselves.	It	is	to	resist	seeing	
him	tainted	and	shaped	by	our	 fears,	needs,	and	(typically	narcissis-
tic)	fantasies.	I	agree	with	Murdoch.	But	it	is	important	not	to	forget	
that	attentive	love	is	not	just	an	ideal	because	it	involves	a	moral	and	
epistemological	improvement	in	the	lover,	but	because	it	provides	the	
beloved	with	the	sense	that	he		who	he	really	or	most	fully	or	deeply	
is 	is	the	object	of	another’s	loving	attention.24	He	can	let	down	his	
guard,	and	let	another	in.25
To	 illustrate	 the	difference	 that	 loving	attention	 to	and	of the	be-
loved’s	self	or	soul	can	make	to	him,	 let’s	revisit	Michael	Stocker’s	fa-
mous	example	of	Smith,	dutifully	visiting	you	while	you	are	 “bored	
and	restless	and	at	loose	ends”	in	hospital.26	In	Stocker’s	example,	our	
concern	about	the	quality	of	Smith’s	attitudes	toward	you	arises	when	
we	learn	that	he	has	come	to	see	you	not	because	he	was	motivated	
to	do	so	“directly”,	but	“…	because	he	thought	it	his	duty,	perhaps	as	
a	fellow	Christian	or	Communist	or	whatever,	or	simply	because	he	
knows	of	no	one	more	 in	need	of	cheering	up	and	no	one	easier	 to	
24.	As	Nussbaum	characterizes	this	ideal	in	her	reading	of	the	Phaedrus,	it	is	love	
of	the	beloved’s	character	“through	and	through”	(218).	That	one’s	whole self 
is	the	object	of	love	is	why,	as	Susan	Wolf	writes,	love	can	boost	one’s	self-
esteem.	For	a	discussion	of	a	related	feature	of	love,	how	it	functions	as	a	be-
stowal	of	status,	see	Sandra	Lee	Bartky,	“Feeding	Egos	and	Tending	Wounds:	
Deference	and	Disaffection	in	Women’s	Emotional	Labor”	in	Femininity and 
Domination.
25.	 “I	 don’t	want	 to	 change	 you/	 I	 don’t	want	 to	 change	 you/	 I	 don’t	want	 to	
change	your	mind/	I	just	came	across	a	manger/	Where	there	is	no	the	dan-
ger/	Where	 love	has	eyes	and	 is	not	blind”.	Damien	Rice,	 “I	don’t	want	 to	
change	you”	in	My Favourite Faded Fantasy (2014).
26.	Michael	Stocker,	“The	Schizophrenia	of	Modern	Ethical	Theories”,	Journal of 
Philosophy	73:14	(1976),	462.	Stocker	did	not	refer	to	the	problem	he	describes	
as	one	of	“alienation”,	though	both	Peter	Railton	and	Adrian	Piper	do.	Railton,	
“Alienation,	Consequentialism,	and	the	Demands	of	Morality”,	Philosophy and 
Public Affairs: 13:2	(1984).	Piper,	“Moral	Theory	and	Moral	Alienation”,	Journal 
of Philosophy, 84:2	(1987).	
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sake,	 can	 be	 done	 without	 affection,	 without	 enthusiasm		 some-
times	without love at all.31
What	is	unfortunate	for	you	about	a	dutiful	friend’s	visit	is	not	that	
her	love	is	lacking in	moral	quality,	but	just	that	your	friend	finds	you	
burdensome because	she	no	longer	has	affection	for	your	character	or	
personality.	Though	she	sincerely	hopes	for	your	speedy	recovery	for	
your	sake,	she	is	not	interested in	you.	To	put	this	plainly:	she	doesn’t	
like	you.	This	is	glum,	and	you	may	justifiably	feel		even	as	she	sits	
by	your	side	and	tells	you	a	story	about	her	day	to	keep	your	thoughts	
occupied		estranged	from	her,	though	you	may	also	have	no	moral	
complaint	nor	doubts	about	the	fact	that	she	loves	you.32
Thus,	it	matters	that	we	are	not	just	loved,	but	appreciated	or	liked	
for	who	we	are.	However,	it	is	still	not	clear	that	attentive	love,	now	
understood	as	partly	a	matter	of	having	affection	for	the	beloved’s	char-
acter,	will	alleviate	the	beloved’s	feelings	of	alienation	in	the	kind	of	
case	 I	 started	with,	where	we	 can	 imagine	 that	 precisely	what	 is	 at	
31.	 “To	be	 committed	 to	meeting	 children’s	demand	 for	preservation	does	not	
require	enthusiasm	or	even	 love;	 it	 simply	means	 to	 see	vulnerability	 and	
to	respond	to	 it	with	care	than	abuse,	 indifference,	or	flight”.	Sara	Ruddick,	
Maternal Thinking: Toward a Politics of Peace	(Boston:	Beacon	Press,	2002),	19.	
This	point,	I	think,	is	exactly	right	and	can	clearly	be	extended	beyond	the	
vulnerabilities	of	children.	
32.	 Though	I	have	other	objections	to	his	account	of	love,	I	agree	with	Frankfurt’s	
observation	that	
	 …	lovers	often	enjoy	the	company	of	their	beloveds,	cherish	various	types	
of	intimate	connection	with	them,	and	yearn	for	reciprocity.	These enthusi-
asms are not essential.	Nor is it essential that a person like what he loves.	He	may	
even	find	it	distasteful.”	The Reasons of Love, 43,	my	emphasis.	
	 Nonetheless,	this	may	lead	to	some	justified	saltiness	on	the	part	of	the	be-
loved.	Consider	an	example	from	the	recent	film	Lady Bird.	In	response	to	her	
mother’s	retort	that	a	pink	and	frilly	dress	which	Lady	Bird	takes	to	exemplify	
her	personality	is	too pink,	Lady	Bird	(Saoirse	Ronan)	laments,	“I	just	wish…	
I	wish	that	you	liked	me.”	Her	mother	(Laurie	Metcalf)	replies,	“Of	course	I	
love	you.”	“But	do	you	like	me?”	Her	mother	replies,	“I	want	you	to	be	the	very	
best	version	of	yourself	that	you	can	be.”	“What if this is the best version?”	(It	is	
no	accident	that	writer-director	Greta	Gerwig	was	influenced	by	Simone	Weil,	
whose	proposal	that	love is attention	is	developed	by	Murdoch	and	given	voice	
to	by	Sister	Sarah	Joan	(Lois	Smith).)
well,	wants	to	alleviate	your	boredom	and	loneliness,	and	hopes	you	
will	recover	and	get	back	to	your	life	soon,	all	for	your	sake.	She	does,	
in	a	real	sense,	love	you.	But	she	has	found	that	she	finds	you	tedious	
or	 impossible	to	spend	time	with;	she	 is	not	curious	about	your	 life,	
has	little	desire	to	stay	in	touch,	and	absolutely	no	desire	to	spend	a	
lazy	day	chatting	and	lounging	around	the	house,	as	once	you	loved	
to	do.	But	when	she	hears	that	you	are	in	hospital,	she	unhesitatingly	
recognizes	 that,	 after	all,	 she	owes	 it	 to	you	 to	pay	you	a	visit.	And	
seeing	you	 lying	 there	all	 sick	and	pale	and	at	 loose	ends,	she	 feels	
genuinely	sorry	for	you.
In	this	case,	the	obligation	that	Zahra	is	and	feels	bound	by,	is	an	
obligation	to	you.	She	does	in	some	sense	care	about	you	in	particular.	
And	by	 visiting	 you,	 she	 is	 fulfilling	her	 obligation	 to you.	But	why	
might	you	still	find	Zahra’s	attitudes	not	exactly	what	you	had	hoped	
for,	even	though	you	have	no	moral	grounds	to	object to	them?29	The	
worry	in	this	case	cannot	be	that	you get	into	the	picture	in	only	an	in-
direct	manner.	Rather,	it	is	that	even	though	you	may	want	your	friend	
to	visit	you	because	it’s	you, you	might	also	not	want	your	friend	to	
visit	you	mainly	or	solely	because	she	is	obligated	to	do	so,	or	even	if	
she	desires	your	wellbeing	for	your	sake		even	when	you	are	the	par-
ticular	person	she	is	obligated	to,	or	the	particular	person	whose	well-
being	she	cares	about.	As	Stocker	notes	elsewhere,	there	is	a	familiar	
and	crucial	 role	 that	duty	and	obligation	play	 in	close	 interpersonal	
relationships:	as	being	relied	upon	precisely	when	our	feelings	of	af-
fection	are	“worn	thin”.30	And	we	should	not	 forget,	also,	 that	much	
of	caring	about	the	wellbeing	of	another,	sincerely	and	for	their	own	
29.	Angela	 Smith	 argues	 that	 included	 among	 the	 many	 things	 we	 owe	 our	
friends	are	certain	attitudes;	however,	she	emphasizes	attitudes	of	care	and	
concern,	respect,	taking	pleasure	in	their	accomplishments,	and	feeling	sad-
ness	in	their	losses.	We	can	imagine	that	Zahra	feels	all	these	things	toward	
you.	She	 just	doesn’t	 like you.	Smith,	 “Guilty	Thoughts”	 in	Morality and the 
Emotions,	Carla	Bagnoli	(ed.)	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2011).
30.	Stocker,	465,	fn.	9.
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One	way	of	understanding	the	challenge	Glory	faces	is	that	it	arises	
given	certain	assumptions	about	what	traits	of	character	or	personality	
love	can	be	an	appropriate	response	to.	Consider,	for	example,	Kate	
Abramson	and	Adam	Leite’s	conception	of	love.33	In	elaborating	on	Pe-
ter	Strawson’s	suggestion	that	there	is	a	particular	kind	of	reactive	love	
that,	in	his	words,	is	“the	sort	of	love	which	two	adults	can	sometimes	
be	said	to	feel	reciprocally,	for	each	other”,34	they propose	a	love	that	is	
“an	affectionate	attachment	appropriately	felt	as	a	non-self-interested	
response	to	particular	kinds	of	…	features	of	character	expressed	by	
the	loved	one	….”35	So	far,	so	good.	
The	problem	emerges	once	we	see	 that	 the	 features	of	 character	
that	Abramson	and	Leite	believe	love	is	an	appropriate	affectionate	re-
sponse	to	must	be	“morally	laudable	ones”.	Putting	aside	a	more	gen-
eral	objection	one	could	raise	to	this	idea,	when	it	comes	to	the	prob-
lem	of	alienation,	it	is	exactly	this	kind	of	love	that	the	beloved	will	be	
wary	of.	Jack	cannot	trust	it,	as	at	this	point	in	his	life,	he	(reasonably)	
believes	that	he	cannot	satisfy	the	conditions	that	it	sets,	nor	is	it	even	
clear	to	him		given	who	he	actually	and	presently	is		that	he	would	
want to	meet	 its	conditions	if	he	could.36	And	so,	Glory’s	problem	is	
complicated	by	the	fact	that	not	only	is	Jack	lacking	in	good	qualities	
that	may	make	him	easier	or	more	appropriate	 to	 love	according	 to	
this	view,	he	is	also	alienated by	certain	forms	of	 love,	 including	this	
one.	They	have	driven	him	from	his	home.	
33.	 “Love	as	a	Reactive	Emotion”,	The Philosophical Quarterly, 61:245	(2010).
34.	 “Freedom	and	Resentment”	in	Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays (Lon-
don:	Methuen	&	Co.	Ltd.,	1974),	9.
35.	 Abramson	and	Leite,	677.
36.	Consider	this	constructed	type	of	conversation	between	Jack	and	his	father,	
combining	memories	of	different	token	conversations:	“Jack,	can	you	tell	me	
why	you	have	done	whatever	you	did,	acted	however	you	did?	No,	sir.	You	
can’t	explain	 it,	 Jack?	No,	sir.	…	You	do	understand	that	what	you	did	was	
wrong.	Yes,	sir,	I	understand	that.	Will	you	pray	for	a	better	conscience,	better	
judgment,	Jack?	No,	sir,	I	doubt	that	I	will.	Well	I’ll	pray	for you	then.	Thank	
you,	sir.”
issue	 is	 the	question	of	whether	or	not	 the	beloved,	because	of	his	
character,	is	worth this	kind	of	attentive	affection,	and	where	this	ques-
tion	is	for	him	live	enough	to	animate	his	shame.	Having	spelled	out	
shame’s	 connection	with	vision,	 I	 can	now	state	more	explicitly	 the	
challenge	facing	the	ideal	of	attentive	love	if	it	is	to	foster	connection	
rather	 than	 threaten	 it.	What	attentive	 love	strives	 to	do	(to	see	 the	
beloved	as	he	really	is)	is	exactly	what	prompts	his	shame:	he	is	being	
seen	by	the	other	as	who	(he	fears)	he	really	is.	
Nonetheless,	 I	will	argue	 that	alternative	views	of	 love,	precisely	
because	they	are	less attentive,	only	exacerbate	this	problem,	and	that	
the	ideal	of	attentive	love,	when	modified	or	supplemented	by	grace, 
can	resolve	it.	In	section	V,	I	will	discuss	this	supplementation.	Before	
doing	so,	I	will	first	consider	three	otherwise	promising	views	of	love	
and	demonstrate	how	 they	each	exacerbate	 rather	 than	alleviate	es-
trangement	between	lovers.	
IV. Love, Vision, and Connection
To	guide	and	 illustrate	 this	discussion,	 I	will	use	as	an	extended	ex-
ample	Marilynne	Robinson’s	novel,	Home.	In	it,	Glory	faces	a	problem	
that	 is	 similar	 to	 the	 one	 I	 started	with.	 As	 an	 adult,	 she	 is	 now	 fi-
nally	getting	to	know	her	older	brother,	Jack,	who	has	been	away	from	
home	for	twenty	years,	and	of	whom	Glory	has	only	childhood	memo-
ries.	Their	re-acquaintance	begins	tenuously	and	develops	in	fits	and	
starts	as	Jack	reveals	and	confesses	his	vices,	always	with	the	wariness	
and	expectation	that	at	some	point	his	sister	will	either	have	to	direct	
her	attention	elsewhere,	or	attenuate	her	affection	 for	him.	And	his	
apprehensions	are	partly	justified:	she	comes	to	see	that	he	really	is,	
among	other	things,	a	“drunk”,	a	“thief”,	and	a	“liar”.	She	comes	to	learn	
that	he	has	no	excuse	for	fathering	and	abandoning	a	daughter,	whom	
Glory	comes	to	care	for	and	eventually	 love	before	the	child	dies	of	
illness.	And	importantly,	Glory	comes	to	see	the	traits	of	his	character	
and	personality	that	underlie	and	explain	Jack’s	drunkenness,	thievery,	
and	lying:	he	is,	among	other	things,	partly	cowardly	and	partly	preda-
tory,	arrogant,	and	belligerent.	
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This	marks	an	 important	moment	 in	 the	novel:	an	affirmation	of	
Glory’s	 attitudes	 toward	 Jack.	Earlier	 in	 their	 re-acquaintance,	Glory	
had	noticed	and	remarked	that	she,	as	she	puts	it,	likes his	soul the way 
it is.	Given	the	sort	of	person	Jack	is,	and	the	person	Glory is,	she	was	
puzzled	by	this.38	Now,	explicitly	within	a	context	in	which	Jack	has	
again	failed	to	 live	up	to	values	and	standards	of	conduct	they	both	
recognize	the	authority	of,	and	in	response	to	another	breaking	and	
darkening	of	his	soul,	Glory	re-affirms	and	expresses	her	affection for	
his soul the way it is.	Though	Jack	tries	to	deflect	the	comment	by	sug-
gesting	that	Glory	doesn’t	really	know	what	his	soul	is	like,	she	point-
edly	demonstrates	that	her	affection	toward	him	is	paired	with	a	dis-
cerning	awareness	of	his	vices	and	the	distinctive	ways	in	which	they	
manifest	in	his	behavior.	Rather	than	quarrel	with	or	reject	his	claim	
that	she	doesn’t	know	him	by	citing	the	good	qualities	one	might	ar-
gue	he	nonetheless	possesses,	she	alludes	to	those	she	knows	he	finds	
most	shameful.	But	he	need	not	fear	that	her	love	assumes	too	much,	
nor	need	he	shrink	from	her	gaze.	She	likes	his	soul	the	way	it	is;	her	
love	is	gracious.	
Before	offering	one	proposal	for	how	to	understand	what	grace	or	
gracious	love	is,	and	before	showing	how	it	alleviates	the	problem	of	
alienation,	 I	will	 now	 consider	 three	 contemporary	 theories	 of	 love	
that	can	ground	the	appropriateness	and	rationality	of	loving	the	peo-
ple	we	do,	even	when	their	souls	are	in	a	bad	state.	However,	none	
emphasizes	 the	 importance	 of	 attention	 to	 and	 affection	 for	 the	 be-
loved’s	character	or	personality.	Though	these	forms	may	make	it	less	
puzzling	how	it	could	be	coherent, rational,	or	appropriate for	Glory	to	
love	Jack,	they	will	not	help	with	the	problem	of	alienation,	precisely	
because	of	their	lack	of	attention	to	who	the	beloved	is,	and	because	
of	the	operations	of	shame.
277−278.
38.	Glory	 is	both	a	morally	good	and	pious	person.	We	also	 learn	 that	Glory’s	
dreams	of	a	simple	family	life	had	been	painfully	shattered	by	a	man	who,	like	
Jack,	took	advantage	of	a	“vulnerable	woman”.
Glory	 is	able	 to	meet	 this	challenge	better	 than	any	of	 the	other	
members	 of	 their	 family	 or	 townsfolk	 of	 Gilead	 who	 become	 reac-
quainted	with	 Jack	upon	his	 return.	Consider	 this	 scene	 late	 in	 the	
novel,	in	which	Glory	reflects	on	the	quality	of	Jack’s	soul	while	help-
ing	him	wash	up	from	a	night	of	heavy,	self-destructive	drinking:
Glory	said,	 “You	might	rub	your	hands	with	shortening.	
That	would	probably	dissolve	the	grease.	…”	She	took	the	
can	from	the	cupboard,	scooped	out	a	spoonful,	and	put	it	
in	his	palm.	She	said,	“Remember	when	you	talked	to	me	
about	your	soul,	about	saving	it?”
He	 shrugged.	 “I	 think	 you	may	be	mistaking	me	 for	
someone	else.”
“And	I	said	I	liked	it	the	way	it	is.”
“Now	 I	know	you’re	mistaking	me	 for	 someone	else.”	
He	did	not	look	up	from	the	massaging	of	his	hands.	
“I’ve	 thought	 about	 what	 I	 should	 have	 said	 to	 you	
then,	and	I	haven’t	changed	my	mind	at	all.	…	[Y]our	soul	
seems	fine	 to	me.	 I	don’t	know	what	 that	means	either.	
Anyway,	it’s	true.”
He	said,	“Thanks,	chum.	But	you	don’t	know	me.	Well,	
you	know	I’m	a	drunk.”
“And	a	thief.”
He	 laughed.	 “Yes,	a	drunk	and	a	 thief.	 I’m	also	a	 ter-
rible	coward.	Which	is	one	of	the	reasons	I	lie	so	much.”
She	nodded.	“I’ve	noticed	that.”
“No	kidding.	What	else	have	you	noticed?”
“I’m	not	going	to	mention	vulnerable	women.”
“Thanks,”	he	said.	“Very	generous	in	the	circumstances.”
She	nodded.	“I	think	so.”
He	said,	 “I	am	unaccountably	vain,	despite	all,	and	 I	
have	a	streak	of	malice	that	does	not	limit	itself	to	futile	
efforts	at	self-defense.”	
“I’ve	noticed	that,	too.”37
37.	Marilynne	 Robinson,	 Home	 (New	 York:	 Farrar,	 Straus	 &	 Giroux,	 2008),	
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of	his	actions.41	His	 father’s	 love,	which,	when	affectionate,	 is	based	
on	the	interpretation	of	Jack	that	emphasizes	the	fact	that	Jack	started 
off a	lonelier	and	more	estranged	child,	only	leaves	Jack	feeling	more	
ashamed	and	defensive.	When	siblings	and	well-wishers	express	their	
faith	in	Jack,	these	expressions	only	push	him	further	away.42 
Why	is	this?	Return	to	the	operations	of	shame.	First,	even	if	others	
have	faith	that	Jack	will	become	a	better	person,	or	that	deep	down	
he	is	a	better	person,	Jack does not.43	Thus,	their	love	does	nothing	to	
alleviate	the	shame	he	would	feel	in	light	of	a	more	discerning	other	
who	he	imagines	sees	all	of	him,	and	all	through	him,	or	who	would	
not	take	his	childhood	as	providing	a	genuine	excuse	for	who	he	has	
become.	He	cannot	trust	himself	to	be	the	kind	of	person	that	those	
who	have	faith	in	him	believe	he	can	be,	nor	does	he	fully	identify	as	
the	kind	of	person	that	the	charitable	see	in	him.	So	their	vision	of	him,	
in	 failing	 to	 see	him	as	he	 sees	himself,	 cannot	pierce	 through	 and	
dispel	the	shame	prompted	by	who	he	fears	he	is		it	instead	changes	
the	topic.44	Second,	his	shame	is	exacerbated	by	their	willingness	to	
continue	to	give	him	the	benefit	of	the	doubt:	though	a	temperamen-
tally	different	person	might	react	more	positively	to	another’s	sincere	
41.	 Glory	offers:	“That	was	all	so	long	ago.	You	were	young.”	Jack	responds,	“No,	
I	wasn’t	young.	I	don’t	believe	I	ever	was	young.	…	Excuses	scare	me,	Glory.	
They	make	me	feel	like	I’m	losing	hold.	I	can’t	explain	it.	But	please	don’t	try	
to	make	excuses	for	me.”	Excuses	often	work	by	distinguishing	what	one	did	
from	who	one	really	is;	Jack	feels	disoriented	by	excuses	because,	as	he	expe-
rienced	his	actions,	they	were	the	product	of	who	he	really	is,	not,	for	example,	
the	result	of	weakness	or	immaturity	or	a	lapse	of	thought.
42.	 Faith	 is	 expressed	by	 another	 character	 (Lila),	 implicitly	 as	 a	way	 to	 think	
about	Jack:	she	suggests	that	God’s	grace	is	the	understanding	that	everyone 
can change for the better.	Immediately	following	this,	Jack	goes	off	the	rails	once	
again,	drinking	himself	into	oblivion.	It	is	after this	episode	that	Glory	restates	
her	sentiment.	“I’m	trying,	but	I’ve	gone/Through	the	glass	again/	Just	come	
and	find	me/	God	loves	everybody,	don’t	remind	me”.	The	National,	“Grace-
less”	in	Trouble Will Find Me	(2013).
43.	 “Graceless/	 I	 figured	out	how	 to	be	 faithless/	But	 it	would	be	 a	 shame	 to	
waste	this/	You	can’t	imagine	how	I	hate	this/	Graceless”.	Ibid.
44.	 Jack	responds	to	Glory’s	claim	that	she	wouldn’t	care	if	he	were	a	petty	thief	
(implying	that	she	trusts	or	has	faith	that	he	is	not, in	fact,	a	petty	thief),	“That’s	
very	subjunctive	of	you”.
I’ll	consider	three	views	here:	(i)	 the	proposal	that	 loving	people	
often	 involves	 being	 epistemically	 partial	 toward	 them,	 (ii)	 the	 pro-
posal	that	we	love	people	just	because	of	the	relationship	we	stand	in	
with	them	or	because	of	our	shared	history,	and	(iii)	the	neo-Kantian	
proposal	that	when	we	love	a	person,	we	love	not	the	qualities	of	his	
character	or	personality	(good	or	bad),	but	his	personhood or	humanity.
Begin	with	the	proposal	that	Glory	should	focus	her	attention	on	
more	 optimistic	 or	 charitable	 interpretations	 of	 Jack’s	 character.	 As	
Sarah	Stroud	has	argued,	there	are	many	ways	in	which	we	can	see	an-
other	in	a	more	positive	light,	some	of	which	result	from	an	epistemic	
partiality	that	good	friends	(and	good	lovers	more	generally)	exhibit	
toward	 one	 another.39	 In	 a	 similar	 vein,	 according	 to	 Ryan	 Preston-
Roedder,	 faith	 in	 another	 person	 involves	 believing	 of	 him	 that	 he	
is	fundamentally	good	or	decent,	even	when	one	lacks	the	evidence	
needed	to	fully	justify	that	belief.40	While	this	sort	of	faith	is	the	basis	
of	a	moral	virtue,	Preston-Roedder	also	argues	that	it	is	an	important	
aspect	of	sustaining	and	nourishing	a	loving	relationship	with	another,	
noting	how	having	faith	in	a	person	can	bolster	his	self-esteem.
I	have	no	objection	 to	 the	claim	 that	 in	many	of	our	 friendships,	
forms	of	epistemic	partiality	are	needed	and	valuable;	 it	 is	also	true	
that	 faith	 in	others	 can	 sustain	 loving	 relationships,	may	be	 exactly	
the	kind	of	response	that	your	beloved	needs	to	bolster	his	confidence	
in	his	abilities,	and	is	the	basis	of	a	centrally	important	moral	virtue.	
The	challenge,	again,	is	that	in	certain	contexts,	with	people	of	a	cer-
tain	temperament,	something	else	may	be	needed	to	fully	reach	out	to	
the	beloved	without	alienating	him	further		a	kind	of	love	that	isn’t	
based	on	partial	or	charitable	interpretations	of	who	he	is,	on	faith	that	
he	is	better	than	he	is,	or	that	he	will	eventually	become	the	better	per-
son	you	believe	him	to	be.	To	illustrate	this,	return	to	Jack.	He	objects	
and	resists	when	his	family	members	offer	charitable	interpretations	
39.	Sarah	Stroud,	“Epistemic	Partiality	in	Friendship”,	Ethics, 116:3	(2006).
40.	Ryan	Preston-Roedder,	“Faith	in	Humanity”,	Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research,	87:3	(2013).	
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Why	is	 this?	 In	the	hospital	example	I	described	above,	you	may	
feel	a	bit	glum	or	hurt	that	your	friend	doesn’t	like	or	appreciate	your	
personality	or	character	anymore.	But	now	consider	how	you	might	
feel	if,	like	Jack,	you	are	also	ashamed of	who	you	are.	He	knows	that	
not	only	has	his	 family’s	 affection	 for	him	worn	 thin	 (and	 that	 they	
often	rely	on	a	sense	of	duty	to	motivate	their	love	of	him),	but	he	also	
knows	that	he	is	a	disappointment	to	them.48	When	his	family	nonethe-
less	continues	to	love	him	and	express	this	love	through	a	sincere	con-
cern	for	his	wellbeing	simply	because	he	is	their brother	or	son,	and	not	
because	of	who	he	is,	this	only	confirms	Jack’s	fears	that	if	they	were 
to look	more	closely	at	who	he	is,	their	affection,	if	not	their	concern	
for	his	wellbeing,	would	be	challenged	and	attenuated	 as it in fact is.	
Moreover,	that	his	family	members	remain	committed	to	his	wellbeing	
for	the	simple	reason	that	he	is	their	brother	or	son	only	furthers	his	
shame	and	exacerbates	his	 feelings	of	 vulnerability	 and	 lack	of	 self-
respect,	and	this	in	turn	causes	his	self-protective	touchiness.	
Finally,	what	about	the	idea	that	Glory	loves	Jack	because	Jack	 
like	all	human	beings		has	the	value	of	personhood or	humanity?	Ac-
cording	to	David	Velleman,	all persons,	even	those	with	the	kind	of	
character	that	Jack	has,	are	worthy	of	both	respect	and	love	simply	in	
virtue	of	 their	 existence	as	 rational	beings.	Others	have	objected	 to	
Velleman	by	denying that	 there	 is	 an	essential	 and	valuable	 feature	
that	all	 rational	beings	share,	or	by	arguing	that	Velleman’s	account,	
48.	 Jack’s	shame	is	surely	compounded	by	 the	 fact	 that	he	knows	that	his	 fam-
ily	members	are	not	just	liable	to	be	disappointed	by	him,	but	they	are	also	
ashamed of	him.	Ward	E.	Jones	argues	that	this	 is	partly	because	one’s	well-
being	depends	upon	the	wellbeing	of	 those	whom	one	loves	(and	so	their	
shame	is	your	shame),	and	because	to	love	someone	is	to	persistently	believe	
in	the	beloved’s	moral	goodness.	I	agree	about	the	connections	Ward	propos-
es,	but	disagree	that	this	persistent	belief	is	just	part of	what	loving	another	
person	is.	As	I	am	arguing	here,	it	may	be	ideal	to	give	up	the	persistent	belief	
in	the	beloved’s	moral	goodness,	and	love	the	person	as	he	is	regardless.	It’s	
true	that	one’s	wellbeing	can	depend	upon	the	wellbeing	of	one’s	loved	ones,	
but	the	ideal	of	attentive	love	strives	to	eliminate	the	extent	to	which	this	will	
determine	and	shape	how	one	sees	and	what	one	needs	from	the	beloved.	
See	Ward	E.	 Jones,	 “A	Lover’s	Shame”,	Ethical Theory and Moral Practice,	 15:5	
(2012).	
faith	in	him,	Jack’s	shame	has	already	made	him	touchy	and	resentful	
in	response	to	 the	blind	charity	of	others,	and	unable	 to	handle	 the	
unspoken	burden	made	on	anyone	who	one	has	trust	or	faith	in.	
Similar	problems	arise	with	forms	of	love	that	are	inattentive	to	a	
person’s	character	not	because	they	involve	forms	of	epistemic	partial-
ity,	but	because	they	are	grounded	in	facts	that	lie	outside	it.	As	Niko	
Kolodny	has	argued,	a	paradigmatic	form	of	 love	is	the	love	we	feel	
toward	 those	we	stand	 in	certain	 relationships	with.45	One	can	 love	
a	person	in	this	way	even	if	there	is	nothing	about	the	quality	of	that	
person’s	character	that	one	thinks	of	as	good:	it	is	sufficient	that	one	
has	shared	a	history	with	him,	or	that	one	stands	in	a	certain	important	
relationship	to	him,	such	as	being	his	genetic	parent.46	Who	he	is	oth-
erwise	is	not	of	much	importance.	
The	problem	with	 this	kind	of	 love	 is	not	 that	 it	 isn’t	 intelligible,	
rational,	 appropriate,	or	 valuable.	 It	 can	be	all	 these	 things,	 and	 im-
portantly,	it	can	make	sense	of	why,	in	the	kind	of	case	I	began	with,	
you	might	continue	to	love	your	friend	simply	for	having	known	him	
for	all	these	years;	it	is	also	what	seems	to	be	at	work	in	the	example	
of	you	and	Zahra.	There	is	a	kind	of	loyalty	exemplified	by	those	who	
love	in	this	way.	However,	within	certain	contexts	such	as	the	ones	I’ve	
focused	on,	the	beloved	might	need	something	else	beyond	a	love	that	
is	stable	because	it	is	based	on	just	one’s	relationship	or	history	with	
him:	a	kind	of	love	that	is	attentive	and	responsive	to	who he is.47 
45.	 “Love	as	Valuing	a	Relationship”.
46.	Niko	Kolodny,	 “Which	Relationships	 Justify	Partiality?	The	Case	of	Parents	
and	Children”,	Philosophy & Public Affairs,	38:1	(2010).
47.	 Part	of	 the	 tension	 toward	 the	end	of	 the	novel	 involves	 Jack	making	sure	
that	he	leaves	the	family	household	before	Teddy,	his	good	and	accomplished	
older	brother,	comes	to	tend	for	their	dying	father.	Jack	recollects:	
 
	 [Teddy]	came	to	St.	Louis	and	hunted	me	down.	He	walked	around	the	
back	streets	with	a	couple	of	photographs	until	he	found	someone	who	
recognized	me.	It	took	him	days.	He	was	just	out	of	medical	school.	And	I	
was		not	in	very	good	shape.	That	may	have	been	my	nadir,	in	fact.	We	
sat	on	a	bench	and	ate	sandwiches	together.	He	asked	me	to	come	home	
with	him,	but	I	declined.	He	offered	me	some	money	and	I	took	it.	A	miser-
able	experience	for	both	of	us.	
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Notice	how	Velleman	has	demarcated	the	territory	of	the	self	here.	
It’s	true	that	many	people	might	reasonably	not	want	to	be	loved	solely 
because	of,	for	example,	the	yellow	of	their	hair	(an	example	that	Vel-
leman	uses),	 their	flesh	 and	blood (literally),	 or	 their	mere	behavior.	
Even	if	 these	are	intrinsically	valuable	qualities,	 they	(on	their	own)	
serve	as	relatively	shallow	reasons	for	somebody	to	love	you,	and	they	
are	shallow	because	 the	qualities	of	one’s	appearance	or	patterns	of	
behavior	are	not	on	their	own	aspects	of	one’s	character	or	personali-
ty.52	These	are	qualities	accessible	to	one’s	“empirical”	sense	of	vision.	
But	 importantly,	 these	 shallow	 qualities	 are	 altogether	 and	 impor-
tantly	different	from	one’s	sense	of	humor,	taste	in	music,	boisterous	
temperament,	or	cutting	temper.	It	 is	important	that	we	not	conflate	
the	first	set	of	qualities	(of	one’s	appearance	and	behavior)	with	the	
second	 (of	one’s	 character	or	personality),	 even	 though	 it	would	be	
strange	to	think	of	either	as	“accessible	to	purely	intellectual”	experi-
ence.	Moreover,	one	might	want	to	be	loved	for	the	second	set	of	qual-
ities	(of	the	character	or	personality)	not	because	they	are	expressive	
of	a	“deeper”	value	or	“inner	self”	that	lies	underneath or	beyond	them,	
or	because	they	are	the	necessary	means	to	loving	that	deeper	value,	
but	because	they	constitute	who he is.	Indeed,	these	qualities	are	of	the	
very	kind	that	are	at	issue	when	it	comes	to	Jack’s	shame.53 
But	 Velleman’s	 proposal	 is	 Kantian.	What	 about	Kant?	 Consider	
Kant’s	proposal	when	he	considers	 the	question	of	whether	we	can	
52.	 To	be	clear,	I	am	not	claiming	that	these	shallow	forms	of	love	are	not	“really	
forms	of	love”,	or	that	they	are	obviously	worse than	other	forms	of	love	that	
ground	 themselves	 in	character	or	personality,	or	 that	anyone	who	 is	after	
a	shallow	form	of	love	is	doing	so	under	the	guise	of	a	deeper	form	of	love.	
They	strike	me	as	just	different	ways	for	human	beings	to	be	attached	and	at-
tracted	to	one	another,	and	that	we	have	some	reason	philosophically,	and	in	
our	personal	lives,	to	not	confuse	them	for	one	another.	Thank	you	to	Ulrika	
Carlsson	for	discussion	of	this	point.
53.	 Though	of	course,	we	can	also	be	ashamed	of	our	more	empirically	accessible	
qualities	(e.g.	our	bodily	appearance)		 in	which	case,	one’s	shame	might	
very	well	be	alleviated	by	a	love	of	those	qualities.	I	might	have	affection	for	
your	paunch,	your	scar,	or	your	snaggle	tooth;	should	you	care	at	all	about	
how	I	see	you	and	whether	I	love	you,	this	might	very	well	go	some	way	in	
alleviating	some	of	your	shame	about	these	things.	
in	grounding	love	in	what	also	grounds	respect,	cannot	accommodate	
for	the	selectivity	of	personal	love.	I	will	discuss	a	different	worry	from	
these,	raised	by	the	problem	of	alienation.	
I’ve	already	noted	that	other	views	of	love	do	not	take	seriously	the	
idea	that	Jack	is	to	be	appreciated	for	who	he	is.	While	Velleman’s	ac-
count	seems	better	able	to	accommodate	the	beloved’s	self	(and	while	
Velleman	himself	presents	his	view	as	an	articulation	of	 the	Murdo-
chian	 ideal	 of	 attentive	 love),	 it	 is	 important	 to	 see	what	 Velleman	
considers	that	self	to	be,	and	the	way	in	which	we	are	to	appreciate	it.	
Velleman	writes:
The	immediate	object	of	love,	I	would	say,	is	the	manifest	
person,	embodied	in	flesh	and	blood	and	accessible	to	the	
senses.	The	manifest	person	is	the	one	against	whom	we	
have	emotional	defenses,	and	he	must	disarm	them,	if	he	
can,	with	his	manifest	qualities.	Grasping	someone’s	per-
sonhood	intellectually	may	be	enough	to	make	us	respect	
him,	but	unless	we	actually	see a	person	in	the	human	be-
ing	confronting	us,	we	won’t	be	moved	to	love;	and	we	
can	see	the	person	only	by	seeing	him	in	or	through	his	
empirical	persona.49 
In	 other	 words,	 Velleman’s	 Kantian	 view	 relies	 on	 a	 distinction	 be-
tween	a	self	that	is	accessible	to	the	senses	(“the	manifest	person”	or	
“the	empirical	persona”),	and	a	self	(his	“personhood”)	that	is	grasped	
“intellectually”.	When	we	 love	 the	 “empirical	persona”,	 our	 love	 is	 “a	
response	to	[his	manifest	qualities]	as a symbol or reminder of	his	value	
as	a	person”.50	As	Velleman	 then	puts	 this	point,	 “One	doesn’t	want	
one’s	value as a person	to	be	eclipsed	by	the	intrinsic	value	of	one’s	ap-
pearance	or	behavior;	one	wants	them	to	elicit	a	valuation	that	looks	
through	them,	to	the	value	of	one’s	inner	self”.51
49.	 “Love	as	a	Moral	Emotion”,	371.
50.	Ibid.
51.	 Ibid.,	372,	my	emphasis.
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V. Grace and Shame
So	far,	 I	have	argued	that	views	of	 love	which	are	less	attentive	will	
only	exacerbate	the	problem	that	Glory	and	Jack	face.	This	is	because,	I	
have	argued,	given	that	what	gives	rise	to	Jack’s	alienation	is	his	shame	
and	fear	that	 if one were to see him as he truly is, he	could	only	inspire	
feelings	of	disappointment,	pity,	or	contempt,	less	attentive	forms	of	
love	do	not	alleviate	his	fear,	but	rather,	serve	to	confirm	it.	
Return	now	 to	 the	 ideal	 of	 attentive	 love,	which	Glory’s	 love	 ex-
emplifies	 in	 the	 passage	 above.	 Glory’s	 love	 does	 not	 skirt	 around	
the	facts	of	Jack’s	past	and	the	conclusions	that	one	would	justifiably	
draw	about	his	character.	It	is	not evasive.	And	because	her	response	
is	nonetheless	one	of	attentive and	affectionate love	for	his	soul,	rather	
than	contempt	or	disappointment	or	resentment,	it	allows	her	to	see	
and	speak	truthfully	about	him	without	the	reactions	that	have	made	
that	truth	so	painful	to	him.	Because	her	response	is	nonetheless	one	
of	attentive and	affectionate love	for	his	soul	rather	than	compassion or	
pity, it	doesn’t	risk	being	insulting	or	overbearing.	In	letting	down	his	
guard,	given	Glory’s	affection	for	him,	Jack	allows	himself	to	be	seen	
and	 loved	by	 her,	 thereby	 retaining	 some	 small	 but	 utterly	priceless 
connection	with	another	human	being.
However,	there	is	still	a	challenge	remaining	even	if	we	are	to	un-
derstand	Glory’s	love	as	providing	us	with	an	image	of	the	ideal	of	at-
tentive	love.	Suppose	that	one	grants	that	the	ideal	is	valuable	if	it	can	
be	made	sense	of,	but	that	it	is	hard	to	see	how	it	could	be.56	One	might	
character,	but	it	is	again	a	kind	of	love	that	Jack,	given	his	inability	to	believe	
that	he	will change	over	time,	would	find	alienating.	Those	who	have	a	more	
fluid	conception	of	themselves,	or	who	aspire	to	a	quasi-existentialist	process	
of	continually	creating	who	they	are,	may	also	not	need	or	want	fully	atten-
tive	love	as	I’ve	described	it.	Jack,	however,	is	at	the	point	at	which	he	cannot	
believe	that	he	will	ever	really	change	at	all.	For	a	dynamic	view	of	love	that	
can	accommodate	existentialist	lovers,	see	Benjamin	Bagley,	“Loving	Some-
one	in	Particular”,	Ethics, 125:2	(2015).
56.	A	different	important	worry	that	one	might	have	is	whether	loving	someone	
graciously	can	come	at	the	cost	of	other	important	values	and	ideals.	Could	
being	gracious	toward	a	loved	one	come	at	the	cost	of	one’s	own	dignity	or	
self-respect?	Could	it	come	at	the	cost	of	being	giving	others		perhaps	those	
“well-like”	 and	 not	 just	 “well-wish”	 a	 villain.	 His	 answer,	 like	 Velle-
man’s,	treats	the	qualities	of	the	villain’s	character	as	of	secondary	or	
non-essential	 importance	 in	 comparison	 to	his	 abstract	humanity or	
personhood:	
…	nobody	 can	have	 such	a	 liking	where	 there	 is	no	ob-
ject	of	which	to	approve.	There	is,	however,	a	distinction	
to	be	drawn	in	a	man	between	the	man	himself	and	his	
humanity.	I may thus have a liking for the humanity, though 
none for the man.	I	can	even	have	such	liking	for	the	villain	
…	for	even	in	the	worst	of	villains	there	is	still	a	kernel	of	
good-will.54
So	we	have	two	answers	that	will	be	unsatisfying.	On	the	one	hand,	
Glory	can	draw	a	distinction	between	Jack	and	his	humanity,	have	af-
fection	for	the	latter	and	none	for	the	former.	Alternatively,	Glory	can	
have	affection	 for	 Jack,	as	 long	as	she	believes	 that	 (or	has	 the	 faith	
that)	even	in	the	worst	of	villains,	there	remains	a	kernel	of	good	will.	
The	objection	here	 is	not	 that	 there	 isn’t this	 kernel	of	 good	will	 in	
Jack		arguably,	there	is,	even	if	he	and	the	people	of	Gilead	cannot	
see	it.	The	objection	is	that,	on	this	picture,	in	order	to	have	affection	
for	Jack,	Glory	must	either	rely	on	what	can	only	seem	to	him	to	be	a	
kind	of	faith or	charitable	interpretation	(that	even	in	him	there	is	still	
a	kernel	of	good	will);	or,	supposing	that	there	is	there	“no	object	of	
which	to	approve”	(as	Jack	fears),	all	he	can	receive	from	her	is	sincere	
well-wishing,	and	not	well-liking.	We	have	already	seen	that	either	op-
tion		 faith	and	charity,	or	good	will	without	affection		will	only	
exacerbate	Jack’s	estrangement.55 
54.	 Immanuel	Kant,	Lectures on Ethics,	 trans.	 J.	B.	 Schneewind,	 ed.	 Peter	Heath	
(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1997),	27:418,	my	emphasis.
55.	 This	discussion	 is	not	meant	 to	be	an	exhaustive	consideration	of	 the	vari-
ous	forms	of	love	that	one	might	have	in	response	to	Jack.	Michelle	Mason	
has	suggested	to	me	that	the	kind	of	 love	that	Glory	has	 is	a	 love	“in	pros-
pect”:	that	is,	it’s	a	kind	of	love	that	recognizes	that	Jack,	like	all	human	beings,	
doesn’t	have	a	static	character	and	is	liable	to	grow	and	change.	This	proposal	
captures	the	importance	of	loving	a	person	over	time	and	the	dynamism	of	
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nature.57	Those	qualities	are	not	always	qualities	that	we	should	think	
of	as	good	in	any	non-trivial	sense.	Nonetheless,	it	is	still	possible	to	
become	endeared	 to	an	object	upon	noticing	 its	possession	of	 such	
qualities,	in virtue of recognizing	its	possession	of	those	qualities.	
There	are	many	everyday	examples	of	this	kind	of	affection	that	I	
could	point	 to,	but	 I’ll	 start	with	an	 illustration	 from	within	philoso-
phy.58	 In	her	discussion	of	what	 she	describes	 as	 “arational”	 actions,	
Rosalind	Hursthouse	proposes	 that	while	 some	aspects of	 our	 emo-
tional	lives	as	human	beings	can	be	“rationalized”	and	made	valuable	
through	 this	 process,	 other	 aspects	 are	 typically	 left	 untouched.	 Ex-
amples	of	“arational”	actions	include	those	explained	by	anger,	hatred,	
or	jealousy,	such	as	
violently	destroying	or	damaging	anything	remotely	con-
nected	with	the	[hated]	person	…	e.g.,	her	picture,	letters	
or	presents	 from	her,	awards	 from	her,	books	or	poems	
about	her;	the	chair	she	was	wont	to	sit	 in,	 locks	of	her	
hair,	recordings	of	‘our’	song,	etc.59 
Here,	too,	Hursthouse	discusses	in	detail	the	example	that	has	puz-
zled	action	theorists:	that	of	Jane,	who,	“in	a	wave	of	hatred	for	Joan,	
57.	 Adams	 notes	 that	 certain	 undesirable	 qualities	 can	 also	 serve	 as	 qualities	
that	 ground	 love	of	 a	particular	person,	but	gives	 alternative	 (and,	 I	 think,	
non-competing)	explanations	of	how	this	is	possible.	One	is	that	some	of	our	
qualities		those	that	we	can	see	in	light	of	a	person’s	suffering	or	need		“…	
can	be	a	window	into	her	humanity”	(168).	Such	qualities	can	draw	us	closer	
to	the	beloved	because	of	the	possibility	of	helping	or	comforting	her.	I	agree.	
But	grace	as	I’ve	described	it	is	different	in	two	respects.	Not	all	qualities	of	
human	nature	are	those	we	should	see	as	resulting	from	suffering	or	need,	at	
least	without	 seeing	 them	 in	a	 fairly	condescending	or	 inattentive	manner,	
e.g.	if	my	friend	were	to	view	my	impatience	or	rudeness	as	arising	from	my	
suffering	or	need,	and	not	just	from	how	I	construe	the	world	given	who	I	
am,	I’d	probably	conclude	that	my	friend	really	didn’t	know	me	after	all.	And	
again,	I	want	to	emphasize	the	affection we	can	feel	toward	such	qualities,	not	
just	the	motivations	we	have	to	care	for	or	comfort	those	who	suffer	or	are	in	
need	(which	again,	can	be	condescending		at	least	to	those	like	Jack).	
58.	Rosalind	Hursthouse,	“Arational	Actions”,	Journal of Philosophy,	88:2	(1991).
59.	 Ibid.,	58.
think	a	person’s	soul	in	these	cases	would	repel a	discerning	eye	rather	
than	attract	it.	As	Kant	plainly	puts	this	claim	in	the	passage	I	quoted	
above:	 “Nobody	 can	have	 such	a	 liking	where	 there	 is	no	object	of	
which	to	approve”.
The	 ideal	of	attentive	 love	can	respond	 to	 this	challenge,	but	we	
must	modify	 or	 supplement	 the	 ideal	 of	 attention	with	 the	 ideal	 of	
grace.	Consider	first	Robert	Adams’	discussion	of	grace,	by	which	he	
means	love’s	non-proportionality with	the	goodness	of	its	object		cap-
turing	the	idea	that	grace	is	a	meritless	gift.	Adams	argues	that	this	is	
an	essential	aspect	of	all genuine	or	good	forms	of	love.	I	am	inclined	
to	agree	with	this,	at	least	when	it	comes	to	interpersonal	love.	But	I	
shall	use	the	term	‘grace’	to	focus	on	a	more	specific	attitude,	where	
this	love’s	lack	of	proportionality	is	explained	by	the	fact	that	though	
it	 is	 responsive	 to	 qualities	 of	 the	 beloved,	 it	 is	 not	 fundamentally	
responsive	 to	his	good	qualities.	The	proposal	 I	offer	 is	 that	grace	 is	
love	that	is	non-proportional	to	the	goodness	of	its	object	because	it	
is	an	affectionate	love	felt	in	response	to	perceived	qualities	of	human	
who	have	suffered	at	the	hands	of	the	beloved,	or	perhaps	just	others	who	are	
even	more	needy		their	due?	(Might	it	even	constitute	a	wrong	to	them?)	
Perhaps.	Is	there	a	way	for	the	practically	wise	person	to	balance	or	harmo-
nize	one’s	graciousness	with	her	other	virtues	and	fulfill	her	duties	to	others?	
I	hope	so.	A	few	points	about	the	emotions	may	help	alleviate	some	worries	
here.	The	first	is	that	to	experience	an	emotion	is	not	ipso facto to	act	in	some	
determinate	way	rather	than	another	(e.g.	saving	one’s	beloved	wife	rather	
than	a	drowning	stranger),	even	though	emotions	typically	come	with	char-
acteristic	behavior	and	actions.	 It	 is	dogmatic	behaviorism	to	deny	this.	To	
borrow	a	quote	from	Murdoch,	slightly	out	of	its	context,	“We	are	such	inward	
secret	creatures,	that	inwardness	is	the	most	amazing	thing	about	us,	even	
more	 amazing	 than	our	 reason”.	The Sea, The Sea (London:	 Penguin	Books,	
2001),	 173.	The	second	 is	 that	 it	would	be	a	mistake	 to	 think	 that	one	can	
only	feel	one	emotion	at	a	time	toward	the	same	object,	and	that	seemingly	
antithetical	emotions	cannot	be	held	consistently	with	one	another.	Gracious	
love	need	not	be	inconsistent	with,	for	example,	feeling	resentful	toward	the	
beloved	when	he	does	something	wrong,	just	as	to	forgive	someone,	need	
not	involve	completely	foregoing resentment,	as	argued	by	Andrea	Westlund	
in	“Anger,	Faith,	and	Forgiveness”,	The Monist,	92:4	(2009).	How	exactly	grace	
would	 interact	with	other	 emotions,	 and	how	graciousness	would	 interact	
with	other	virtues,	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	paper.
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This	 is	 not	 a	 complete	 explanation	 of	 why	 we	 are	 affectionate	
toward	 these	 aspects	 of	 ourselves	 and	others,	 nor	 is	 it	 a	 systematic	
presentation	of	these	aspects,	but	it	is	the	beginning	of	one.	We	have	
some	sense	already	of	what	we	mean	by	“human	nature”.	As	Philippa	
Foot	emphasizes,	virtues	are	best	understood	as	correctives	to	the emo-
tional	and	motivational	tendencies that	one	finds	in	human	beings.63 
Thus,	 in	 investigating	virtues	and	vices	at	all,	we	must	already	have	
in	mind	some	conception	of	what	human	nature	 is	 like		one	 that	
is	 understood	 in	 terms	 of	 thick	 psychological	 qualities	 and	 disposi-
tions.	And	what	we	know	about	those	qualities	and	dispositions	will	
inform	the	content of	the	virtues.	For	example,	we	know	that	courage	
is	a	virtue	 that	 corrects	 the	emotions,	motives,	pains,	and	pleasures	
that	partly	constitute	both	cowardice	and	foolhardiness;	we	know	that	
temperance	is	a	virtue	that	corrects	for	the	emotions,	motives,	pains,	
and	pleasures	that	constitute	gluttony	and	(as	Aristotle	observes,	more	
rarely	found	in	human	beings	given	our	nature)	abstemiousness.	On	
this	picture,	grace	would	then	be	a	love	for	human	nature, where	hu-
man	nature	is understood	to	include	those	emotional	and	motivation-
al	tendencies	and	qualities	that	the	virtues	are	needed	to	correct	for:	
the	intemperate,	the	immoderate,	the	cowardly	and	the	foolhardy,	the	
stingy	and	 the	ostentatious,	 the	boastful	and	 the	undignified.	To	be	
gracious	would	be	to	have	the	disposition	to	love	those	qualities	with	
affection,	at	the	right	time,	to	the	right	extent,	and	in	the	right	ways,	
not	because	they	are	good,	but	because	they	are	human.
Why	would	these	qualities	bring	us	closer	to	a	clear-eyed	view	of	
the	person who	 is	 the	object	of	our	 love?	Typically	 (perhaps	 ideally),	
these	aspects	of	a	person’s	psychology	will	not	be	fully	tamed	by	vir-
tue	or	brought	in	line	with	moral	obligation	and	duty,	and	may	even	
buck	 up	 against	 its	 constraints.	 But	 importantly,	 they	 nonetheless	
render	him	and	his	actions	what	Peter	Goldie	has	called	“primitively	
intelligible”.64	As	Goldie	argues,	this	kind	of	intelligibility	allows	us	to	
63.	 “Virtues	and	Vices”	 in	Virtues and Vices: and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy 
(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2002).	
64. The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration	 (Oxford:	 Oxford	 University	 Press,	
tears	at	 Joan’s	photo	with	her	nails,	and	gouges	holes	 in	 the	eyes”.60 
My	interest	here	 is	not	 in	Hursthouse’s	arguments	about	 the	nature	
of	 intentional	 action,	but	 rather	 in	an	observation	 she	makes	about	
the	kinds	of	beings	we	are.	While	suggesting	 toward	the	end	of	 the	
paper	that	we	would	not	want	to	rid	ourselves	of	or	totally	suppress	
these	actions	and	the	unruly	emotions	and	motives	that	prompt	them,	
Hursthouse	writes:
We	might	well	find	something	rather	touching	or	endear-
ing	about	people’s	performing	many	of	 the	arational	ac-
tions;	even	the	disturbingly	violent	ones	seem	to	evoke	
some	 sort	 of	 bond	of	 sympathy.	When	 I	have	 read	 this	
paper	to	discussion	groups,	I	have	found	that	the	list	of	
the	 examples	 at	 the	beginning	 always	provokes	 instant	
delighted	recognition	….61 
Hursthouse’s	 remark	highlights	 the	distinctive	affect	of	 the	emotion	
I’m	 interested	 in:	 it	 is	 “delighted”	 recognition,	 a	 feeling	 of	 “endear-
ment”		rendering	it,	again,	a	love	of	affection, rather	than	a	response	
of	compassion or	respect.	Along	with	her	observation,	we	can	reflect	
on	the	common	idea	that	people	are	more	 likeable	to	the	extent	that	
they	are	“humanized”	in	light	of	their	flaws;	it	is	a	journalistic	cliché	to	
write	about	the	likeability	of	athletes,	artists,	or	actors	given	how	hu-
man (i.e.	imperfect)	they	seem	to	be		a	reminder	that	such	people	are,	
after	all,	mere	human	mortals.	Hursthouse	also	offers	an	alternative	
explanation	 for	 those	who	would	suggest	 that	 this	 feeling	 is	always	
the	result	of	“the	weak	and	fallible	finding	improper	pleasure	in	having	
company”.62	What	can	also	explain	this	affection	is	that	what	we	value,	
or	at	least	like	about	ourselves	(that	is,	us	human	beings),	is	that	we	are	
partly	plainly	emotional	creatures	and	not	always	rational-emotional	
ones.	
60.	Ibid.,	59.
61.	 Ibid.,	68.
62.	 Ibid.
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Again,	the	qualities	that	render	a	person	primitively	intelligible	to	
us	and	which	can	also	be	the	basis	of	affection	are	not	in	any	non-triv-
ial	sense,	good.	A	clear-eyed	view	of	your	friend	will	respect	this.	But	to	
love	in	this	way	is	to	refuse	to	look	away	from	these	aspects	of	who	he	
is,	excuse	them,	or	see	them	as	what	one	abstracts	from	when	loving	
him,	leaving	a	core	of	who	he	more	truly	or	deeply	is	(if	only	he	were	
better	than	he	in	fact	is).	Combined,	gracious	love’s	two	attributes	 
its	accuracy	and	its	affection		render	it	able	to	alleviate	the	problem	
of	alienation.	Like	shame,	it	is	a	complex	emotion.	It	incorporates	both	
how	the	shameful	agent	sees	himself	in	the	discerning	and	penetrat-
ing	eyes	of	another,	and	so	acknowledges	that	this	is who	he	is,	rather	
than	evading	the	issue.	Rather	than	excusing	his	bad	behavior	as	not	
really	part	of	who	he	is	(and	thereby	undermining	his	sense	of	himself	
as	an	agent),	it	grants	to	him	and	his	shame	that	he	really	is	that	kind	
of	person	who	sees	the	world	this	way	and	acts	as	he	does.	But	at	the	
same	 time,	 it	 allows	 for	 a	 reaction	unlike	disappointment,	pity,	 con-
tempt,	or	compassion	for	who	he	is		it	is	to	feel	affection	for	who	he	
is,	through	and	through.	
Because	affection	is	not	based	on	merit	(and	is	thus	a	“free	gift”	to	
the	beloved), it	avoids	encumbering	him	with	the	presupposition	that	
he	is	what	he	isn’t,	or	the	faith	or	trust	that	he	can	become	what	he	
cannot	or	will	not.	And	because	the	attitude	of	affection	is	not	a	gift	
that	is	typically	merited,	but	given	in	this	particular	case	without	con-
sideration	of	merit,	it	does	not	“lower”	or	presuppose	the	lower	status	
of	the	receiver	in	the	way	that	charity	or	mercy	can.	Thus,	it	is	less	of	
a	threat	to	the	beloved’s	dignity.	Importantly,	however,	we	should	not	
confuse	the	fact	that	grace’s	affection	is	meritless	with	it	being	either	
blind or	ultimately	focused	on	something	beyond	the	person	it	is	felt	
toward.	It	is	a	response	to	qualities	the	lover	sees	in	the	beloved.	And	
when	 felt	 for	 a	 particular	 human	 being,	 it	 is	 not	 love	 for the	 quali-
ties	of	human	nature	abstractly	understood,	or	the	abstract	concept	of	
and	amplifies	the	horror	of	her	murder	at	Babi	Yar.	Murphy,	“Kant	on	Theory	
and	Practice”	 in	Theory and Practice,	 Ian	Shapiro	and	 Judith	Wagner	Decew	
(eds.),	(New	York:	New	York	University	Press,	1995).
get	a	sense	of	what	is	going	on	with	the	person	we	are	attending	to	in	a	
way	that	is	distinctively	“personal”  we	are	able	to	see	him	as	another	
human	being	with	a	point	of	view,	thoughts,	feelings,	and	emotions	of	
his	own,	vicious	though	he	may	be. It	is	to	see	him	from	what	Strawson	
calls	the	“participant	stance”,	and	to	love	him	graciously	is	to	respond	
to	him	in	light	of	these	qualities		as	another	person,	a	fellow	adult	
	with	affection.65 
2009).	As	Aristotle	notes,	we	can	understand	human	vice;	we	do	not	react	with	
blame	(a	second-personal,	or	participatory	reaction)	to	the	bestial	vices,	but	
rather,	with	fear	(VII, NE).	For	some	more	discussion	of	these	ideas	and	their	
relationship	to	the	guise	of	the	good	thesis,	see	Vida	Yao,	“The	Undesirable	
and	the	Adesirable”,	Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,	99:1	(2019).
65.	At	this	point,	one	might	hope	for	a	more	general,	theoretical	approach	to	un-
derstanding	what	the	qualities	of	human	nature	are,	and	so	arrive	at	a	more	
determinate	picture	of	what	qualities	grace	is	responsive	to,	or	harbor	some	
skepticism	about	the	legitimacy	of	the	claims	that	there	are such	qualities.	I	
have	not	offered	such	a	theoretical	approach,	nor	have	I	fully	defended	the	
legitimacy	of	the	idea	of	human	nature;	my	proposal	can	thus	be	seen	as	a	
framework	for	grace.	Note,	however,	the	extent	to	which	any moral	theory	op-
erates	by	already	assuming	that	there	are	such	qualities,	as	well	as	proposing	
concretely	what	they	are.	As	Allen	Wood	argues,	Kant’s	ethics	is	formulated	
given	a	particular	conception	of	human	nature.	For	Kant,	we	are	the	species	
that	sets	its	own	ends,	but	we	are	also	highly	competitive	and	possess	deep	
impulses	of	both	self-love	and	self-conceit.	We	need	the	moral	law	to	strike	
down	our	self-conceit	 in	particular,	precisely	because	(so	Kant	claims)	 it	 is	
such	a	powerful,	natural	tendency	within	us.	Wood	also	makes	a	more	gen-
eral	methodological	point	about	ethical	theory	worth	pausing	on:	
 
	 Basic	to	any	practical	science	is	a	knowledge	of	its	materials	…	it	must	be	
based	on	a	knowledge	of	human	nature,	on	human	psychology	in	a	broad	
sense	(Kant’s	name	for	it	is	‘anthropology’).	The	intellectual	power	of	an	
ethical	 theory	 is	mainly	 a	 function	 of	 its	 anthropology.	 “Unsociable	 So-
ciability:	The	Anthropological	Basis	of	Kantian	Ethics,”	Philosophical Topics, 
19:1	(1999),	326.	
 
	 Wood’s	 remark	 reminds	us	 that	 it	 is	not	 just	Aristotle	 and	Kant	who	must,	
in	offering	us	powerful	ethical	theories,	strive	to	understand	human	nature	
in	 terms	of	 thick	qualities	of	psychological	disposition,	 and	 so	not	 just	Ar-
istotelians	and	Kantians	could	adopt	 the	 framework	of	grace	 I	am	offering.	
Think	of	Hobbes’	conception	of	human	nature	(fearful,	curious,	and	narrowly	
self-interested);	think	of	Plato’s	(appetitive,	spirited,	always	at	risk	of	illusion).	
Think	 of	 Freud’s.	As	 pointed	out	 by	 Jeffrie	Murphy,	 consider	 the	 love	 that	
one	may	feel	for	Frau	Anna	G,	the	central	figure	of	D.	M.	Thomas’s	novel,	The 
White Hotel,	and	how	the	intimacy	of	one’s	knowledge	and	love	for	her	colors	
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discussions	with	Laura	Gillespie,	Kyla	Ebels-Duggan,	Ryan	Davis,	and	Oded	
Na’aman.	 I	have	benefited	 from	discussion	with	audiences	at	UNC-Chapel	
Hill,	 the	University	of	Toronto,	New	York	University,	and	the	University	of	
Chicago.	Special	thanks	are	owed	to	Kristina	Gehrman,	Ulrika	Carlsson,	An-
drea	Westlund,	and	Uriah	Kriegel	for	detailed	comments	as	well	as	stylistic	
suggestions.	Finally,	I	am	indebted	to	Zahra	Hussain	Rizvi,	Mary	Renee	Lind-
sey,	and	Christopher	R.	Hakkenberg.
“human	nature”.	It	is	distinct	from	forms	of	love	justified	by	a	person’s	
bare	or	abstract	personhood or	humanity,	as	well	as	the	explicitly	theo-
logical	view	that	all	human	beings	are	worthy	of	love	simply	because	
we	are	God’s	creatures.66	These	ideas	on	their	own	pick	out	too	thin	
or	abstract	a	quality	to	serve	as	the	right	object	of	fully	attentive	love,	
given	the	richness	of	the	qualities	of	our	psychological	lives,	our	char-
acters,	and	our	personalities,	and	given	how	our	feelings	of	shame	are	
typically	generated	by	those	concrete,	richer	qualities	that	can	be	so	
apparent	to	those	who	see	us.67	To	be	loved	graciously	is	for	one’s	lover	
to	grant,	and	then	rely	on,	this	repertoire	of	qualities	to	inform	and	sus-
tain	her	affection	for	him.	As	an	ideal	of	love,	grace	asks	one	to	notice 
more	and	feel	affection for more of	one’s	beloved	—	though	it	is	true	that	
he	may	be	too	unruly,	too	fearful,	or	too	wild,	to	be	good.68
66.	Kieran	Setiya	has	recently	argued	for	an	agapic	form	of	love	that	is	sufficiently	
justified	simply	on	the	basis	that	the	object	of	one’s	love	is	a	fellow	human, 
and	not	on	the	basis	of	any	qualities	of	the	beloved.	While	I	agree	with	Setiya	
that	the	fact	that	someone	is	a	human	being	can	sometimes	be	sufficient	for	
love,	I	think	that	without	further	qualifications,	this	kind	of	love	is	too	inat-
tentive	to	avoid	the	problem	of	alienation,	and	depending	on	the	quality	of	
the	love	Setiya	has	in	mind,	it	might,	to	put	it	a	little	too	bluntly,	give	rise	to	
justified	 feelings	 that	 the	 lover	 is	being	 creepy.	After	all,	 it	presupposes	no	
knowledge	of	who	the	beloved	actually	is.	I	also	believe	that	my	proposal	al-
leviates	at	least	some	of	Setiya’s	worry	that	a	quality-based	view	of	love	would	
render	some	people	unlovable.	Kieran	Setiya,	“Love	and	the	Value	of	a	Life”,	
Philosophical Review, 123:3 (2014).	
67.	 For	the	metaphysical	thesis	of	original	sin,	which	of	course	can	be	the	basis	of	
shame	for	some,	a	theological	conception	of	grace	might	be	needed.	Again,	I	
have	no	ambition	or	interest	in	defending	a	theological	conception	of	grace.
68.	“I	am	not	my	rosy	self/	Left	my	roses	on	my	shelf/	Take	the	wild	ones,	they’re	
my	favorites/	It’s	the	side	effects	that	save	us/	Grace/”,“Graceless”.”	For	their	
comments,	 discussion,	 and	 encouragement	 throughout	 several	 develop-
ments	 of	 this	 paper,	 I	 am	grateful	 to	 Susan	Wolf,	 Thomas	E.	Hill	 Jr.,	 Ryan	
Preston-Roedder,	Samuel	Reis-Dennis,	Robert	Smithson,	Douglas	MacLean,	
Benjamin	Bagley,	George	Sher,	John	Lawless,	and	Francey	Russell.	Especially	
helpful	with	 early	 versions	of	 this	 paper	was	 the	 conference	on	neglected	
virtues	held	in	honor	of	Rosalind	Hursthouse	at	the	University	of	Auckland	
in	2015;	my	 thanks,	especially,	 to	Glen	Pettigrove,	Noell	Birondo,	and	Nim	
Kirkham.	Especially	helpful	with	later	versions	of	this	paper	were	comments	
from	Michelle	Mason	Bizri	and	Bridget	Clarke	at	 the	2018	Eastern	APA	 in	
Savannah,	and	the	12th	Annual	Northwestern	Society	for	the	Theory	of	Eth-
ics	 and	Politics	Conference	 in	 2018.	 I	 am	grateful	 for	 comments	 from	and	
